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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In June 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or the “Commission”) filed a 
lawsuit against hotel company Wyndham Worldwide Corporation (“Wyndham”), 
alleging sub-par cybersecurity standards and violations of the FTC Act (the “Act” or 
“FTCA”)),1 highlighted by three data security breaches in 2008 and 2009.2 A little 
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more than a year later, in August 2013, the Commission brought an administrative 
action against LabMD, Inc., a small, little-known medical testing company in 
Atlanta, Georgia, alleging violations of the Act in connection with alleged security 
breaches in 2008 and 2012.3  
Although the FTC complaints in the two actions appeared similar, following a 
format used consistently by the FTC in data breach actions,4 the two cases were 
remarkably different. Perhaps most importantly, Wyndham is a Fortune 500 
company which brought in upwards of $5 billion in revenue in 2015, and owns 
more than 55 hospitality brands, whereas LabMD had approximately 20 employees 
at the time it was sued.5 The breaches which inspired the FTC to sue, as well as the 
alleged security failures, were quite different in the two cases as well. The case 
against Wyndham centered on three different breaches over a period of two years, 
compromising “more than 619,000 payment card account numbers,” which were 
posted to a domain registered in Russia.6 The breaches, according to the FTC, cost 
consumers “more than $10.6 million in fraud loss.”7 Wyndham’s alleged failings 
were specific and egregious: according to the FTC, the company failed to use 
adequate firewalls, allowed payment card information to be stored in readable text, 
did not employ common user ID and password procedures, and two separate times 
failed to correct errors after major breaches.8  By contrast, although the FTC alleged 
broad failures by LabMD to implement and maintain a comprehensive security 
program, the company’s purported wrongdoing centered on the decision of a single 
employee to install P2P file sharing software on a company computer.9 A file 
containing the personal information of LabMD customers was leaked through the 
 
 1.  15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 2.  See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365-SPL (D.N.J. June 26, 2012) [hereinafter Wyndham Complaint]. 
 3.  See generally Complaint, In re LabMD, Inc., (F.T.C. Aug. 29, 2013) (No. 9357), 2013 WL 4761163 
[hereinafter LabMD Complaint]. 
 4.  Compare LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 3–5, with Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 10–18. 
 5.  See Our Company, WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE, http://www.wyndhamworldwide.com/category/our-
company. The company’s brands include Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Ramada, Days Inn, and Super 8. 
Wyndham Hotel Group, WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE, http://www.wyndhamworldwide.com/category/wyndham-
hotel-group. Wyndham Hotel Group, one of three subsidiaries of Wyndham Worldwide, also named in the 
complaint, has over 7,800 properties and 678,000 rooms in 72 countries. Id. For a discussion of the size of 
LabMD, see generally Cheryl Conner, When the Government Closes Your Business, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2014, 5:55 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2014/02/01/when-the-government-closes-your-business/ 
#5b8 94fc53652. 
 6.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 609 (D.N.J. 2014) (citing to allegations 
contained in the F.T.C. Complaint). 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  See infra Section III.B. 
 9.  See infra Section III.A. 
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file-sharing network, but to this day LabMD and the FTC are still fighting about 
whether consumers suffered any actual harm.10  
The Commission’s legal arguments against the two companies were, in the end, 
the same: their failure to employ “reasonable and appropriate measures” to protect 
consumers’ information constituted an “unfair” act or practice under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act.11 Twenty years ago, the Commission would not likely have made this 
“unfairness” argument in the cybersecurity context.12 The underlying legal 
provision, Section 5, prohibits “unfair” and “deceptive” acts or practices, and when 
the FTC first began bringing Section 5 cases in the cybersecurity context, the 
Commission utilized the “deceptiveness” prong, going after companies that had 
promised consumers a certain level of security (in their privacy policies, for 
example), and then failed to deliver.13 This tactic made sense for a time. The private 
sector was still wrestling with how to secure information in a new and quickly 
evolving connected world.  
But in the absence of comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, which the FTC 
has been requesting from Congress since at least 2000, the Commission increasingly 
felt that prevailing security practices were putting consumers at risk, and the 
“deceptiveness” prong of Section 5 was insufficient to police cyberspace 
appropriately.14 The Commission’s decision to broaden its cybersecurity policing 
tactics to include the “unfairness” prong, and to pursue companies that had hewed 
to their privacy policies but nevertheless failed, in the eyes of the FTC, to implement 
adequately robust cybersecurity measures, has been controversial.  
The cases against Wyndham and LabMD have been flashpoints in this 
discussion. In August 2015, after the district court’s denial of Wyndham’s motion 
to dismiss, the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first major ruling on 
the FTC’s application of the unfairness prong to cybersecurity: in general it was an 
endorsement of the FTC’s approach and a victory for the Commission.15 Wyndham 
 
 10.  See infra Section III.E. 
 11.  LabMD Complaint at 5; see also Wyndham Complaint at 2. 
 12.  J. Howard Beales, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FTC’S USE OF UNFAIRNESS AUTHORITY: ITS RISE, FALL, AND 
RESURRECTION (May 30, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-
its-rise-fall-and-resurrection [hereinafter Beales] (“[I]n the 1990’s, the Commission almost entirely avoided the 
use of unfairness. It became the theory of last resort.”). 
 13.  See infra Section II.C. 
 14.  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC 
MARKETPLACE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 36 (2000) https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
reports/privacy-online-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission-report/ 
privacy2000.pdf [hereinafter 2000 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N] (“[T]he Commission recommends that 
Congress enact legislation” that in conjunction with continuing self-regulatory programs, will “ensure adequate 
protection of consumer privacy online.”). 
 15.  See infra Section III.C. 
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subsequently settled.16 As for LabMD, the legal battle goes on.17 After almost three 
years of wrangling with the FTC, an administrative law judge granted LabMD 
dismissal in November 2015, but the Commission later overturned the judge’s 
decision, concluding the administrative action, leaving LabMD with one final shot 
in a federal appeals court.18 If the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the court 
that would likely hear LabMD’s appeal, takes up the case on the merits, it would be 
the second major decision on the FTC’s unfairness approach, possibly either setting 
a trend, if the Eleventh Circuit issues a ruling similar to the Third Circuit’s in 
Wyndham, or creating a circuit split if the courts differ. 
However LabMD turns out, the two cases provide fertile ground for discussing 
the government’s evolving role in policing cybersecurity, and highlights the 
necessity for businesses that handle or store consumers’ personal information to 
pay very close attention to what the FTC says about privacy and cybersecurity. So 
what exactly does the FTC expect? This article’s contention is that the answer to that 
question, in a phrase, is “privacy by design.” Although it was first introduced by the 
Commission in a 2010 privacy report, privacy by design, or PbD, was created by the 
former privacy commissioner of the province of Ontario in Canada, and dates back 
to the mid-1990s.19 Generally speaking, PbD is an admonition that entities think 
about privacy holistically; to imbed it not only in the processes and procedures of 
the enterprise, but to broadly socialize the concept so that it becomes part of the 
organizational DNA. Historically, privacy had been considered as presenting some 
intellectually interesting issues, but organizationally was much less of a priority: a 
“nice to have,” but not a “need to have.” Indeed, the very concept of a “Chief 
Privacy Officer” (“CPO”) only started becoming more commonly accepted within 
the past ten to fifteen years,20 and even to this day, despite the need, frequently 
remains less visible and more marginalized within the organization or may not even 
exist at all.21 
 
 16.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Wyndham Settles FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ 
Payment Card Information at Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-consumers-payment. 
 17.  See infra Section III.E. 
 18.  See infra Section III.E. 
 19.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 20.  In the United States, the CPO position was reportedly first established in 1999 when internet 
advertising firm AllAdvantage appointed privacy lawyer Ray Everett-Church to the newly created role. Justine 
Brown, Rise of the Chief Privacy Officer, GOVERNMENT TECHNOLOGY (May 30, 2014), 
http://www.govtech.com/state/Rise-of-the-Chief-Privacy-Officer.html. The move sparked a trend that quickly 
spread among major corporations. Id. But the CPO position was truly solidified within the U.S. corporate world 
in November 2000 when Harriet Pearson was given the role with IBM. Id. 
 21.   Sarah K. White, 5 Reasons You Need to Hire a Chief Privacy Officer, CIO (Feb. 1, 2016 4:22 AM), 
http://www.cio.com/article/3027929/leadership-management/5-reasons-you-need-to-hire-a-chief-privacy-
officer.html. 
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In sum, the operating principle of PbD is that privacy should be proactive, not 
reactive, and “baked in” to a product’s or a service’s design.22 The concept has 
proven to be both popular and malleable. The FTC’s version identifies four PbD 
principles: data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention practices, and 
data accuracy.23 These principles alone, outlined in the Commission’s various 
reports on cybersecurity, are arguably too broad to be of significant value to 
businesses, but the Commission has pointed to its settlements with Facebook and 
Google in particular as useful guides for implementing PbD, and practical 
manifestations of the Commission’s PbD principles also emerge in its other 
complaints and consent decrees.24 
With fresh sanction from the Third Circuit to prosecute cases using the 
“unfairness” prong of Section 5, the Commission has considerable power to impose 
its PbD program.25 The purpose of this paper is to explore the interplay between the 
Commission’s unfairness doctrine, the Wyndham and LabMD cases, and privacy by 
design. Knowledge of these concepts and cases are critical to understanding the 
current state of cybersecurity regulation in the United States, and necessary for any 
business wanting to steer clear of the FTC’s scrutiny. Part II briefly discusses the 
history of the FTC, the FTC Act, and the Commission’s evolving unfairness 
doctrine as applied to cybersecurity. Part III discusses the Wyndham and LabMD 
cases in detail, including the Third Circuit’s decision validating the Commission’s 
use of the unfairness doctrine, and the FTC’s recent dismissal of LabMD’s appeal of 
an administrative law judge in its favor. Part IV introduces the concept of privacy 
by design, traces the history of the FTC’s use of the concept, and makes some 
practical recommendations for companies wanting to stay out of the FTC’s 
crosshairs. Part V sets forth a brief conclusion. 
II.  THE FTC AND DATA SECURITY 
A.  From Trust Busters to the Golden Rule 
When President Woodrow Wilson signed the FTC Act into law in 1914, the 
Commission opened its doors the following year with a bold but nebulous mission: 
to “protect consumers and promote competition.”26 Enacted concurrently with the 
 
 22.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 23.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 24.  For a full discussion of Facebook and Google settlements, see infra Section IV.B. 
 25.  See F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 610 (D.N.J. 2014) (finding that despite 
Wyndham’s assertions, the FTC may nevertheless bring a claim under the unfairness prong of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act). 
 26.  Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N].  The Commission is composed of five Commissioners 
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, each of whom serves a seven-year term and no more 
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Clayton Act,27 the nation’s first anti-trust law, the Act was originally designed, 
through its prohibition of “unfair methods of competition,” to facilitate “trust 
busting” efforts against the industrial monopolies of the early 20th Century.28 
Senator Francis Newlands, one of the Act’s principle architects, promised that the 
Commission “would ‘destroy’ monopoly, ‘check monopoly in the embryo,’ and 
secure ‘pygmies’ against ‘giants.’”29 
But as the economy grew in size and complexity, the FTC’s authority widened, 
filling out a more expansive interpretation of its mission and morphing into a direct 
consumer protection agency overseeing a variety of economic sectors.30 The most 
rapid expansion of the FTC’s clout came in 1938, when, in response to court 
decisions limiting the Act’s prohibition of “unfair methods of competition” to 
practices actually harming competitors and not consumers, Congress passed the 
Wheeler-Lea Amendment and expanded “Section 5” of the FTCA to encompass 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as well as “unfair methods of competition”— 
“thereby charging the FTC with protecting consumers directly, as well as through its 
antitrust efforts.”31  
The expansion of the FTC’s role was considerable. To illustrate, contrast the 
remarks of Senator Newlands, focused on leveling the playing field for competitors, 
with those of President Franklin Roosevelt, delivered 23 years later at the dedication 
of the FTC’s current home at 600 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.:   
May this permanent home of the Federal Trade Commission stand for all 
time as a symbol of the purpose of the government to insist on a greater 
 
than three of whom may be from the same political party. See Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).  
 27.  15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). 
 28.  Id. § 41. “[T]he Clayton Act . . . links the FTC’s original focus to ensuring a level playing field for 
businesses rather than the consumer protection focus we see today . . . . If one were to view what the FTC was in 
1914, it would have primarily consisted of what is now known as the Bureau of Competition. This stands in 
stark contrast to the FTC of today, which on its website brands itself as the ‘nation’s consumer protection 
agency.’” Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the 
Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814 (2011). 
 29.  Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 77 (2003) (quoting 51 Cong. Rec. 12,030, 12,867, 12,939 (1914)). 
 30.  See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Results of Compliance Testing of 
Over 300 Funeral Homes (Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/02/ftc-
announces-results-compliance-testing-over-300-funeral-homes (discussing how the FTC has gone so far as to 
regulate funeral home compliance within the FTC regulations). 
 31.  Beales, supra note 12 (quoting Act of Mar. 21, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52 Stat. 111, 111); see also 
Winerman, supra note 29, at 96; F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (Wyndham II), 799 F.3d 236, 243 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
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application of the golden rule to conduct the corporation and business 
enterprises in their relationship to the body politic.32 
In accordance with this new mission, the Commission’s authority broadened.33 It 
now used Section 5 and other statutes to oversee a number of areas of the economy 
in the name of consumer protection.34 Today, the FTC polices everything from 
funeral homes,35 vending machine companies,36 telemarketing37 and mail marketing 
schemes,38 credit reporting,39 and the healthcare industry,40 to name a few 
examples.41 
B.  The Two Prongs of Section 5 
One of the most important and widely used of the FTC’s tools is Section 5 of the 
FTCA, added in 1938, as discussed above, as part of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment.42 
 
 32.  Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 26. 
 33.  Beales, supra note 12. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Results of Compliance Testing of Over 300 
Funeral Homes (Feb. 25, 1998), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/02/ftc-announces-results-
compliance-testing-over-300-funeral-homes. 
 36.  The regulation of vending machine operators was part of what the FTC dubbed “Project Telesweep, . . 
. a nationwide federal-state crackdown on business opportunity fraud,” which, according to the Commission, 
“snared nearly 100 marketers of vending machine business opportunities for failure to provide critical pre-
purchase information to potential buyers.” Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Four More “Project Telesweep” 
Defendants Settle FTC Charges (June 5, 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1996/06/four-
more-project-telesweep-defendants-settle-ftc-charges.  
 37.  See generally, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement Requires California Company to 
Halt Illegal Robocalls (May 14, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/05/ftc-settlement-
requires-california-company-halt-illegal-robocalls. 
 38.  See generally, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bogus “Rebate” Offers Violate Federal Law (Aug. 
5, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/08/bogus-rebate-offers-violate-federal-law. 
 39.  See generally, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Certegy Check Services to Pay $3.5 Million for 
Alleged Violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Furnisher Rule (Aug. 15, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/certegy-check-services-pay-35-million-alleged-
violations-fair. 
 40.  See generally, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Stops Marketers of Phony Health Care 
‘Discount’ Schemes Directed at Older Americans and Spanish-Speaking Consumers (Sep. 12, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/09/ftc-stops-marketers-phony-health-care-discount-
schemes-directed. 
 41.  “Under the FTC Act, the FTC has broad enforcement authority over large swaths of the economy. For 
example, the FTC has brought data security actions against retailers, financial institutions, health care-related 
companies, software and mobile app vendors and, notably, companies that sold products and services relating 
to data security.” Soyong Cho & Andrew L. Caplan, Cybersecurity Lessons Learned from the FTC’s Enforcement 
History, K&L GATES LEGAL INSIGHT (K&L Gates LLP, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2014, at 2. 
 42.  See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Section 5 of the FTCA is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) 
(2012). According to the Commission, in addition to the FTCA, “the agency also enforces other federal laws 
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Unlike other specific privacy provisions,43 Section 5’s key language is general (and 
vague): any “person, partnership, or corporation” is forbidden from engaging in 
“unfair or deceptive act[s] or practice[s] in or affecting commerce.”44 In other 
words, Section 5 proscribes two discrete kinds of activity: those that are “deceptive” 
and those that are, more broadly, “unfair.”  
Because Congress has granted the FTC authority to interpret the specific 
provisions of the FTC Act, and because courts generally defer to those 
interpretations, the Commission has wide latitude to say what kinds of acts or 
practices are “deceptive” or “unfair.”45 As to the first prong, the FTC proceeded for 
much of the Act’s post-Wheeler-Lea history on the theory that actual deception was 
not necessary for a deceptiveness claim: it was enough that an act have the potential 
to deceive “an appreciable or measurable segment of the public,” which included 
“the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”46 But in 1983, the Commission 
issued a policy statement on deceptiveness, defining the three elements of a 
deceptiveness claim: “First, there must be a representation, omission or practice 
that is likely to mislead the consumer. . . . Second, we examine the practice from the 
perspective of a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. . . . Third, the 
representation, omission, or practice must be a ‘material’ one.”47 In dissent, two 
Commissioners argued that this new framework was a hard turn away from the 
FTC’s previous “tendency or capacity” and “credulous consumer” standards.48 
 
relating to consumers’ privacy and security.” Enforcing Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/enforcing-privacy-promises. 
 43.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (directing federal agencies to establish privacy standards “to insure 
the security and confidentiality of customer records and information,” to “protect against any anticipated 
threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records,” and to “protect against unauthorized access to or 
use of such records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer”); 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c–1681c–2 (2012) (discussing procedures for protecting information contained in credit 
reports and dealing with identity theft); 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) (2012) (“It is unlawful for an operator of a 
website or online service directed to children, or any operator that has actual knowledge that it is collecting 
personal information from a child, to collect personal information from a child in a manner that violates the 
regulations prescribed under subsection (b) of this section.”). 
 44.  15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), (b). See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1320 (2001) (citations omitted) (“Though the FTC Act does not mention privacy–it 
prohibits unfair and deceptive trade practices–it could in fact offer more informational privacy protection than 
the privacy torts because of the extraordinary scope given its language.”). 
 45.  Sovern, supra note 44, at 1321. 
 46.  See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Deceptive and Unfair Acts and Practices 
Principles: Evolution and Convergence 3 (May 18, 2007) (quoting Feil v. F.T.C., 285 F.2d 879, 892 n.19 (9th 
Cir. 1960); Aronberg v. F.T.C., 132 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1942)). 
 47.  Letter from James C. Miller III, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to John D. Dingel, Chairman, U.S. 
House of Representatives Comm. on Energy and Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ 
documents/public_statements/410531/831014deceptionstmt.pdf. 
 48.  See Rosch, supra note 46, at 4. 
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The Commission was quicker to set the contours of the “unfairness” prong, 
issuing in 1964 a “Statement of Basis and Purpose” which explained the application 
of Section 5 to cigarette advertisements and set forth three factors the Commission 
would consider in deciding whether an act or practice was “unfair”: 
(1) whether the practice . . . offends public policy as it has been established 
by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is 
within at least the penumbra of some common-law, statutory or other 
established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, 
oppressive, or unscrupulous; [and] (3) whether it causes substantial injury 
to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).49 
Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court gave an approving nod to these three 
factors in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., and appeared to endorse the view that 
the Commission could deem a practice unfair based on the third prong (substantial 
injury to consumers) alone.50 
In 1980, at the request of Congress, the Commission issued a second policy 
statement clarifying the three factors. With respect to the third factor, whether a 
practice causes substantial injury to consumers, the Commission explained that 
monetary harms and unwarranted health and safety risks would be key to 
determining whether an injury was “substantial,” and that the injury “must not be 
outweighed by any offsetting consumer or competitive benefits,” and “must be one 
which consumers could not reasonably have avoided.”51 In 1994, Congress codified 
these three factors, incorporating the Commission’s cost-benefit balancing test.52 
C.  Experiments in Self-Regulation 
Although the FTC had these now well-developed tools for policing business 
practices and protecting consumers, they were slow to wield them on one of the 
most important technological and economic developments in United States history: 
the internet. Of course, the impact of the internet’s rise can barely be overstated: the 
 
 49.  Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and 
Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) 
[hereinafter Cigarette Rule Statement]. 
 50.  F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 245 n.5 (1972) (rejecting the argument that “a later 
portion of [the Cigarette Rule Statement] commits the FTC to the view that misconduct in respect of the third 
of these criteria is not subject to constraint as ‘unfair’ absent a concomitant showing of misconduct according 
to the first or second of these criteria”). 
 51.  Policy Statement, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness [hereinafter 1980 Policy 
Statement, Fed. Trade Comm’n]. 
 52.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012); see generally Beales, supra note 12 (discussing the three elements of modern 
unfairness). 
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quickly expanding online marketplace provided exciting business opportunities, but 
also “serv[ed] as a source of vast amounts of personal information about 
consumers, including children.”53 Important information, Americans were starting 
to realize, was often frighteningly insecure in cyberspace. Large-scale cyber-attacks 
were already making headlines in 1994, the year Congress codified the three 
“unfairness” factors, with Russian hackers infiltrating Citibank’s computer system 
and siphoning more than $10 million into various international bank accounts.54 
As cybersecurity was becoming a bigger problem, the FTC might not have been 
acting quickly to impose new regulations, but they were paying close attention. In 
1998, after three years of workshops and hearings, the Commission issued a 63-page 
report on cybersecurity to Congress.55 Although the Commission was dismayed at 
the privacy practices of corporate America, warning that “substantially greater 
incentives are needed,” it recommended that appropriate privacy standards could be 
maintained through self-regulation.56 The Report did, however, include a list of “fair 
information practice principles,” or FIPPs, it would like to see adopted by the 
private sector: specifically: (1) notice/awareness (“[c]onsumers should be given 
notice of an entity’s information practices before any personal information is 
collected from them”); (2) choice/consent (“choice means giving consumers 
options as to how any personal information collected from them may be used”); (3) 
access/participation (“refers to an individual’s ability both to access data about him 
or herself . . . and to contest that data’s accuracy and completeness”); (4) 
integrity/security (“The fourth widely accepted principle is that data be accurate 
 
 53.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS, at i (1998), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-23a.pdf 
[hereinafter 1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N]. 
 54.  The Citibank case was one of the first of its kind to make news, but not likely the first massive breach. 
See Amy Harmon, Hacking Theft of $10 Million From Citibank Revealed, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 1995), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-08-19/business/fi-36656_1_citibank-system (“The incident underscores the 
vulnerability of financial institutions as they come to increasingly rely on electronic transactions. But computer 
security experts say what is even more notable about the case is that it became public . . . . Schultz estimates that 
nearly three dozen cases of computer intruders stealing sums of more than $1 million occur each year in Europe 
and the United States.”). 
 55.  See generally 1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 53. 
 56.  Id. at 41; see also Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 598–99 (2014) (“Instead of the FTC creating rules, the companies themselves would 
create their own rules, and the FTC would enforce them. The FTC thus would serve as the backstop to the self-
regulatory regime, providing it with oversight and enforcement—essentially, with enough teeth to give it 
legitimacy and ensure that people would view privacy policies as meaningful and trustworthy.”). Although the 
1998 Report suggests allowing more time for self-regulation to develop, the Commission called for legislation 
protecting children’s information immediately. 1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 53, at iii (“In the 
specific area of children’s online privacy, however, the Commission now recommends that Congress develop 
legislation placing parents in control of the online collection and use of personal information from their 
children.”). COPPA was signed into law the following October. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012).  
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and secure”); and (5) enforcement/redress (“the core principles of privacy 
protection can only be effective if there is a mechanism in place to enforce them”).57  
The Report stated that “[t]he Commission has encouraged industry to address 
consumer concerns regarding online privacy through self-regulation,” and that 
“[e]ffective self-regulation remains desirable because it allows firms to respond 
quickly to technological changes and employ new technologies to protect consumer 
privacy.”58 In 1999, the Committee issued a second report recommending that self-
regulation be given more time, finding “notable progress” by companies in the 
privacy arena, and citing surveys that showed sixty-six percent of the websites post 
“at least one disclosure about their information practices,” while “forty-four 
percent of these sites post privacy policy notices.”59 
Although the FTC remained generally sanguine about self-regulation, it was also 
dipping its toe into the cybersecurity waters, settling its first “internet privacy case” 
against web hosting company GeoCities in 1998.60 In the FTC’s earliest Section 5 
cybersecurity cases, including GeoCities, the FTC’s accusations were limited efforts 
to go after companies that had violated their own privacy policies under Section 5’s 
“deceptiveness” prong.61 
To the Commission’s dismay, as internet commerce continued to grow and 
consumers’ privacy concerns heightened, these two pillars of its strategy (promoting 
self-regulation and prosecuting deceptiveness cases) eventually began to prove 
 
 57.  1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 53, at 7–10; F.T.C. v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction Over 
Information Privacy is Plausible, But How Far Can It Go?, 62 AMER. U. L. REV. 1401, 1407 (2013) (“The 
detractors assert that ‘extensive, yet vaguely phrased, privacy requirements’ constitute a ‘blank check’ to the 
FTC or any other agency. Others have argued that the Report relies too heavily on FIPPs, which in turn relies 
heavily on reasonability.”). 
 58.  1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 53, at 41.   
 59.  Fed. Trade Comm’n, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on “Self-Regulation and 
Privacy Online,” Address Before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Communications of the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 4–5 (July 13, 1999), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ 
default/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-self-regulation-and-
privacy-online/privacyonlinetestimony.pdf. 
 60.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Internet Site Agrees to Settle FTC Charges of Deceptively 
Collecting Personal Information in Agency’s First Internet Privacy Case (Aug. 13, 1998), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/1998/08/internet-site-agrees-settle-ftc-charges-deceptively-
collecting; see also GINA STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S REGULATION OF 
DATA SECURITY UNDER ITS UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES (UDAP) AUTHORITY, (2014), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43723.pdf [hereinafter STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.] (“In 1995, the FTC first 
became involved with consumer privacy issues. Initially, the FTC promoted industry self-regulation as the 
preferred approach to combatting threats to consumer privacy. After assessing its effectiveness, however, the 
FTC reported to Congress that self-regulation was not working. Thereupon, the FTC began taking legal action 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act.”). 
 61.  Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has the 
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 131–32, 133 n.40 (2008); Even where FTC complaints 
mentioned unfairness, the focus was still on deceptiveness. Id. at 134. 
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inadequate.62 Self-regulation was failing to keep pace with the rapidly growing and 
changing marketplace, at least to the Commission’s satisfaction, and the 
deceptiveness prong of Section 5, which always focused on the “deceptiveness of the 
targeted practices” was of limited value against entities with no privacy policy at all, 
or entities with privacy policies that accurately spelled out inadequate information 
security practices.63 In its various reports, you can see the FTC becoming 
increasingly frustrated and uneasy with the state of cybersecurity in the newly 
connected world. In a second report on cybersecurity released in 2000, just two 
years after its first report, the FTC applauded “the significant efforts of the private 
sector and commends industry leaders in developing self-regulatory initiatives,” but 
concluded that “industry efforts alone have not been sufficient”64 and called on 
Congress to enact comprehensive privacy legislation based on the “fair information 
practice principles” first laid out in 1998.65  
Although the FTC has since taken the lead in setting cybersecurity standards, 
developing something like a body of common law with its vast collection of 
complaints, privacy guides, and consent decrees, it has continued to push Congress 
to enact broad cybersecurity legislation. In 2010 and 2012, in its most recent 
cybersecurity reports, the FTC reissued its calls for legislation based on the FIPPs.66 
 
 62.  See 2000 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, at 1 (“Over the past five years, the Internet has 
changed dramatically from a large network of computers that touched the lives of few consumers to a new 
marketplace where millions of consumers shop for information, purchase goods and services, and participate in 
discussions. The technological developments that have made e-commerce possible also have enhanced the 
ability of companies to collect, store, transfer, and analyze vast amounts of data from and about the consumers 
who visit their sites on the World Wide Web. This increase in the collection and use of data, along with the 
myriad subsequent uses of this information that interactive technology makes possible, has raised public 
awareness and increased concern about online consumer privacy.”). 
 63.  See Scott, supra note 61, at 130, 133, 133 n.41, 11; see also Beales, supra note 12 (“Unfortunately, the 
pendulum swung too far the other way and, in the 1990’s, the Commission almost entirely avoided the use of 
unfairness. It became the theory of last resort. Now, however, the FTC is using unfairness to attack practices 
that cause substantial injury, but that could not be reached under deception theory - at least not without 
twisting the meaning of deception.”).  
 64.  2000 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, at ii. Even in the 1998 Report, it was evident the FTC 
was getting impatient. See 1998 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 53, at 41 (“To date . . . the 
Commission has not seen an effective self-regulatory system emerge. As evidenced by the Commission’s survey 
results, and despite the Commission’s three-year privacy initiative supporting a self-regulatory response to 
consumers’ privacy concerns, the vast majority of online businesses have yet to adopt even the most 
fundamental fair information practice (notice/awareness.)”). 
 65.  See 2000 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 14, at 36 (“Ongoing consumer concerns regarding 
privacy online and the limited success of self-regulatory efforts to date make it time for government to act to 
protect consumers privacy on the Internet.”). 
 66.  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A 
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-
protecting-consumer/101201privacyreport.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N]; FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR 
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In these reports, the Commission also introduced and developed, for the first time, 
the concept of “Privacy by Design” (“PbD”), which businesses can implement by 
“building privacy protections into their everyday business practices.”67 The 
Commission explained that “privacy by design” protections include “providing 
reasonable security for consumer data, collecting only the data needed for a specific 
business purpose, retaining data only as long as necessary to fulfill that purpose, 
safely disposing of data no longer being used, and implementing reasonable 
procedures to promote data accuracy.”68 
So far, Congress has not answered the Commission’s call for broader legislation, 
but it has, at various times, enacted narrower laws aimed at securing specific types 
of online and other data, including the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(“COPPA”),69 which applies to the personal information of children under 13, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”),70 which applies to information collected by 
consumer reporting agencies, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”),71 which 
requires financial institutions to disclose information sharing practices. 
D.  A De Facto Cybersecurity Agency  
In the continued absence of a comprehensive statute,72 the FTC, left alone to police 
the vast number of data practices not covered by specific internet privacy 
legislation, has increasingly begun to apply the “unfairness” prong of Section 5 to 
 
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport 
.pdf [hereinafter 2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N]. For an extended discussion of Privacy by Design, see infra 
Section IV. 
 67.  2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at v. 
 68.  Id. at v, 44. 
 69.  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012). COPPA is designed to put 
parents in control over what information can be collected from children online, and applies to minors under 
the age of 13. Id.; see also Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-asked-questions. The 
text of COPPA directed the FTC to promulgate specific regulations governing the collection of data from 
minors under 13, the result of which was the COPPA Rule, which went into effect on April 21, 2000. See id.; 15 
U.S.C. § 6502 (2012). 
 70.  Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); see also Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/fair-credit-reporting-act (last visited Feb. 14, 2017).  
 71.  15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6827 (1999). 
 72.  That absence continues; most notably, the Cyber Security Act has stalled more than once in Congress. 
See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, Cybersecurity Bill is Blocked in Senate by G.O.P. Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/us/politics/cybersecurity-bill-blocked-by-gop-filibuster.html. In 
February, 2012, President Obama first proposed a “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights,” incorporating the FIPPs. 
Andrew Lustigman & Adam Solomon, An Overview and the Impact of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, INSIDE 
COUNSEL (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2015/03/12/an-overview-and-the-impact-of-the-
consumer-privacy. The bill was reintroduced in February 2015. Id. 
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data security cases.73 Since its first case against GeoCities in 1998, the FTC has filed 
almost 200 privacy cases,74 and since 2005, the Commission has cited the unfairness 
doctrine in almost 30 data security cases.75 Approximately 20 of these “unfairness” 
cases have been filed since 2011.76 In the majority of these cases, the respondent has 
suffered a security breach,77 and the FTC files an administrative complaint78 in 
which it (1) alleges that “respondent engaged in a number of practices that, taken 
together, failed to provide reasonable and appropriate security” for personal 
information, (2) lists the specific data security practices that were insufficient, and 
(3) argues that “respondent’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate security 
measures to protect personal information caused or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
competition and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers.”79 
 
 73.  See Serwin, supra note 28, at 815, 816 (discussing the FTC’s shift from a “notice-and-choice” model of 
enforcement, which was focused on giving consumers informed choices about privacy, and the “harm-based 
model,” which focuses instead on whether the consumer suffered harm). “[T]he harm-based approach, 
represented a departure from the notice-and-choice model. Although the FTC continued to use deception in its 
cases, later cases focused more on actual consumer injury—typically resulting from an alleged breach—and the 
FTC began instead to rely more on its unfairness authority.” Id. at 816. 
 74.  See Legal Resources, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/legal-
resources (selecting type: “Case,” and topic: “Privacy and Security” will cull the site to these relevant cases); see 
also Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56 at 600 (citations omitted) (“[T]hat number is slightly misleading given the 
steady increase in annual complaints. For example, the FTC brought nine privacy-related complaints in 2002, 
compared to 2012, in which it brought twenty-four complaints for unique privacy-related violations.”); Cho & 
Caplan, supra note 41 (“Since 2002, the FTC has brought nearly 60 data security enforcement matters and 
settled more than 50 of those actions. The FTC’s data security activity has accelerated in recent years and likely 
will continue to do so.”). 
 75.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY UPDATE (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
privacy-data-security-update-2015. 
 76.  See Legal Resources, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 74 (offering a database of sortable FTC case, 
which can be filtered to relevant “Data Security” cases, through the “Topic” toggle). This filtering will still not 
include cases where the Commission invokes the text of Section 5, including the unfairness prong, but cases in 
which the complaint is exclusively focused on deception.  See generally, e.g., Complaint, In re Superior Mortg. 
Corp., 140 F.T.C. 926 (Dec. 16, 2005). For a case only focusing on the unfairness prong, or cases in which both 
prongs were invoked meaningfully, see generally Complaint, In re Ceridian Corp., 151 F.T.C. 514 (June 15, 
2011). 
 77.  For an example of an FTC filing that did not involve a “breach” concerning a malicious outsider 
seeking access to company data, see Complaint at 2–3, In re Rite Aid Corp., 150 F.T.C. 694 (2010) (alleging 
disposal of documents with personal information in clearly readable text, such as pharmacy labels and 
employment applications, in a dumpster). 
 78.  Occasionally, the FTC, rather than filing an administrative complaint, files a complaint in federal court 
to enforce Section 5. See generally, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Rental Res. Servs., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 
(D. N.J. Mar. 5, 2009) (No. 13-8887); Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2. 
 79.  Complaint at 2–3, In re Dave & Buster’s, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449 (2011); see also In re ACRAnet, Inc., 
F.T.C. (2011) (No. C-4331). In 2007, the Commission issued a guidebook, which included a “checklist” for a 
“sound data security plan.” Protecting Personal Information: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2016) 
[hereinafter FTC Guidebook]. 
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The Commission’s data security investigations have targeted companies as high 
profile as Microsoft,80 Google,81 Facebook,82 Twitter,83 Snapchat,84 and HTC.85 In 
addition to having authority over privacy matters under specific statutes—such as 
the GLBA,86 COPPA,87 the FCRA88— as well as under Privacy Shield, an agreement 
between the U.S. and the European Union governing transatlantic data flows,89 and 
under the deceptiveness prong of Section 5 of the FTCA,90 the Commission has 
widely applied the unfairness doctrine to data security cases as well.91 Now, the FTC 
can bring an enforcement action not only for a company’s failure to adhere to its 
privacy policy, but for any “unfair” act or practice.92 “This fact has effectively given 
the FTC a sprawling jurisdiction to enforce privacy in addition to the pockets of 
 
 80.  See generally In re Microsoft Corp., 131 F.T.C. 1113 (2015); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Microsoft Settles FTC Charges Alleging False Security and Privacy Promises (Aug. 8, 2002), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/08/microsoft-settles-ftc-charges-alleging-false-security-
privacy. 
 81.  See generally Complaint, In re Google, Inc., (No. C-4336), 2014 WL 6984156 (2014); Press Release, 
Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented Privacy 
Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/08/google-will-pay-225-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-misrepresented. 
 82.  See generally Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc., (No. C-4365), 2012 WL 3518628 (2012); Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Approves Final Settlement With Facebook (Aug. 10, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook. 
 83.  See generally Complaint, In re Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC Accepts Final Settlement with Twitter for Failure to Safeguard Personal Information (Mar. 11, 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-accepts-final-settlement-twitter-failure-safeguard-
personal-0. 
 84.  See generally Complaint, In re Snapchat, Inc., 2014 WL 7495798 (2014); Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-
messages-were. 
 85.  See generally Complaint, In re HTC America, Inc., 155 F.T.C. 1617 (2013); Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, HTC America Settles FTC Charges It Failed to Secure Millions of Mobile Devices Shipped to 
Consumers (Feb. 22, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/02/htc-america-settles-ftc-
charges-it-failed-secure-millions-mobile. 
 86.  See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 88.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 89.  See Privacy Shield Overview, INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMINISTRATION, https://www.privacyshield. 
gov/Program-Overview. Implemented in early 2016, Privacy Shield replaces the Safe Harbor Framework, struck 
down in 2015 by a European Court following revelations by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden about U.S. 
government surveillance practices. See Sebastian Anthony, Europe’s Highest Court Strikes Down Safe Harbor 
Data Sharing Between EU, US, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 6, 2015), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2015/10/europes-highest-court-strikes-down-safe-harbour-data-sharing-between-eu-and-us.  
 90.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 598. 
 91.  STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 60. 
 92.  See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 588. 
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statutory jurisdiction Congress has given to it in industry-specific privacy 
legislation. The FTC reigns over more territory than any other agency that deals 
with privacy.”93 Moreover, the cost of coming under FTC scrutiny is significant: in 
addition to the expense of complying with an FTC investigation, consent decrees in 
data privacy cases contain financial penalties, and reporting, audit, and compliance 
requirements which may last up to 20 years.94 
After almost 20 years of investigating and enforcing internet privacy, the 
Commission has prosecuted a significant number of data security cases, and in 
those cases evolved a set of privacy principles. One commentator has even likened 
the FTC’s consent decrees to a body of common law: the implication is that the 
Commission, in addition to its investigatory role, has become a kind of national 
privacy court, whose case archives companies and individuals comb for applicable 
principles and best practices.95 Regardless of whether, as some argue, the FTC is a 
weak privacy regulator,96 the commission is unrivaled in the privacy arena, and, far 
from pursuing the passive, self-regulatory approach of the mid-nineties, has 
emerged as the leading arbiter of what constitutes reasonable data security.97 
 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 613–14. Generally, an FTC cybersecurity case proceeds in two stages: investigation and 
enforcement. See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement 
Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority 
[hereinafter FTC Overview, FED. TRADE COMM’N]. The investigative stage may include an informal 
investigation, initially. But formally, the investigation stage typically begins with the FTC filing a “civil 
investigative demand” (“CID”), which may require that companies produce documents and oral testimony, in 
addition to written reports or answers to questions. Id. The FTC may petition a federal court to enforce the 
CID, in the event of noncompliance. Id. Following an investigation, the FTC may initiate an enforcement action 
if it has “reason to believe” that the law has been violated. Id. Typically in cybersecurity cases, the FTC initiates 
an administrative enforcement by filing an administrative complaint. Id. If a party wishes to settle the case, it 
may sign a consent agreement, which may include financial penalties, as well as compliance requirements. Id. If 
the party wishes to seek administrative review, the case is adjudicated before an administrative law judge 
(“ALJ”), who issues a final order on the case. Id. In addition to administrative proceedings, the FTC may seek 
enforcement of consent decrees, or of an ALJ’s order, in federal court. Id. 
 95.  For the FTC’s own summary of the principles in its own cybersecurity cases, see Start with Security: 
Lessons Learned from FTC Cases, FED. TRADE COMM’N (June 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/ 
files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf [hereinafter Start with Security]. 
 96.  See, e.g., Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED (June 28, 
2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail/all.  
 97.  See Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2053, 2062 
(2000) (“While the Agency has seemed to promote industry self-regulation, it has all the while been establishing 
the predicate for its jurisdictional grasp over website activities.  Because the FTC is able to gain a jurisdictional 
foothold by means of promoting more respected website privacy norms, the Agency is aptly characterized as a 
privacy norm entrepreneur.”); Solove & Hartzog, supra note 56, at 600 (“Today, the FTC is viewed as the de 
facto federal data protection authority. A data protection authority is common in the privacy law of most other 
countries, which designate a particular agency to have the power to enforce privacy laws. Critics of the FTC call 
it weak and ineffective . . . . But many privacy lawyers and companies view the FTC as a formidable enforcement 
power, and they closely scrutinize FTC actions in order to guide their decisions” (quoting Maass, supra note 
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Although the FTC’s expanded use of the “unfairness doctrine” is not without 
precedent in other areas of law,98 critics argue (among other things) that a data 
security breach does not constitute substantial injury to consumers,99 that the 
“unfairness” prong is too broadly applied,100 and that the FTC has been granted 
sufficient authority in other specific statutes to police data security.101 Because most 
of the cases where the FTC has pressed an unfairness argument have settled, the 
Commission has been free to prosecute cybersecurity cases under the “unfairness” 
prong.  
 
96)); Christopher Matthews, Wyndham, FTC Clash on Cybersercurity, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230467 2404579184291131616548 (“Congress has yet to give any 
Washington agency explicit authority to regulate corporate cybersecurity in general or order companies to beef 
up the security of their systems. So, the FTC has stepped into the breach, citing its long-standing power to 
protect consumers.”); Paul Rosenzweig, Which Federal Agency Controls Cybersecurity? The Answer May Surprise 
You, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117389/ftc-gains-control-
cybersecurity-measures-after-wyndham-hotels -case (“The FTC has a legal hammer, and we can expect the 
agency to use it.”). 
 98.  The FTC’s Policy Statement on Unfairness, delivered to Congress in 1980, argues for an expansive 
interpretation of Section 5: 
The statute was deliberately framed in general terms since Congress recognized the impossibility of 
drafting a complete list of unfair trade practices that would not quickly become outdated or leave 
loopholes for easy evasion. The task of identifying unfair trade practices was therefore assigned to 
the Commission, subject to judicial review, in the expectation that the underlying criteria would 
evolve and develop over time.  
1980 Policy Statement, Fed Trade Comm’n, supra note 51. Since the Commission’s 1980 Policy Statement, the 
FTC’s use of the unfairness doctrine has expanded, contracted, and is now seeing a revival. See Beales, supra 
note 12 (“Unfortunately, the pendulum swung too far the other way and, in the 1990’s, the Commission almost 
entirely avoided the use of unfairness. It became the theory of last resort. Now, however, the FTC is using 
unfairness to attack practices that cause substantial injury, but that could not be reached under deception 
theory - at least not without twisting the meaning of deception.”). Note, however, that the FTC is not the only 
regulator in the cybersecurity game. Private plaintiffs and state authorities are also important checks and 
regulators of cybersecurity. See Alan Charles Raul, et al., United States, in THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 268, 272 (2014). In 2014, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) 
reached a $10 million settlement with two telecommunications companies in the wake of 2012 and 2013 
cybersecurity breaches, the FCC’s first cybersecurity settlement. Tom Risen, FCC Adds Cybersecurity to Its 
Oversight, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/10/24/fcc-adds-cybersecurity-
to-its-oversight. In 2016, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) announced its first cybersecurity 
settlement, with Dwolla, Inc., a digital payment platform that permits real-time bank transfers, and in so doing 
collects sensitive personal information. See Ryan M. Martin & Liisa M. Thomas, U.S. Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau Announces Its First Privacy Settlement, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, (Mar. 15, 2016), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6f24b842-8dfa-45c0-b13e-bba0b79b3505. The consent order 
required Dwolla to pay a penalty of $100,000 to the CFPB, in addition to other compliance requirements. Id. 
 99.  See Scott, supra note 61, at 32. 
 100.  See, e.g., Michael Chertoff, The Lessons of Google’s Safari Hack, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 22, 2012), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303933704577532572854142492 (“Using consumer-protection 
laws to address cyber vulnerabilities is stretching the FTC’s mission beyond recognition.”). 
 101.  Raul, et al., supra note 98, at 272. 
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As discussed below, the Wyndham and LabMD cases represent the first 
significant legal challenges to the FTC’s “unfairness” approach, and the Third 
Circuit’s opinion in Wyndham is, perhaps, the first sign that the FTC will get the 
federal judiciary’s blessing to continue its broadened efforts to police data security 
on the basis of unfairness. 
III. WYNDHAM AND LABMD PUSH BACK 
A.  In the Matter of LabMD 
Atlanta-based LabMD, Inc., was “in the business of conducting clinical laboratory 
tests on specimen samples from consumers and reporting test results to consumers’ 
health care providers.”102 After conducting the tests, LabMD collected payment for 
the tests from consumers’ health insurance companies, from consumers directly, or 
both.103 In performing the tests, and to facilitate payment, LabMD collected 
information about consumers, including patients’ Social Security Numbers 
(“SSNs”), medical record numbers, bank account or credit card numbers, and 
health insurance company names and policy numbers.104 LabMD had collected such 
information from nearly one million consumers, and stored the information on a 
computer network which included computers in LabMD’s corporate offices in 
Georgia, computers used by LabMD personnel in other parts of the country, and 
computers provided by LabMD to healthcare providers.105 
In May 2008, cyber-intelligence company Tiversa informed LabMD that a file 
containing the personal information of approximately 9,300 consumers was 
available on a peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing network through the file-sharing 
application Limewire.106 LabMD subsequently discovered that Limewire had been 
 
 102.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 1. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 2. 
 105.  Id. According to the complaint, LabMD used the computer systems to “receive orders for tests from 
health care providers; report test results to health care providers; file insurance claims with health insurance 
companies; prepare bills and other correspondence to consumers; obtain approvals for payments made by 
consumers with credit cards; and prepare medical records.” Id. at 2. In so doing, LabMD stored, for example, 
monthly spreadsheets of insurance claims and payments (“insurance aging reports”), which included consumer 
names, dates of birth, SSNs, and health insurance company names, addresses, and policy numbers; spreadsheets 
of payments received from consumers (“day sheets”), which include consumer names, SSNs, and methods, 
amounts, and dates of payments; and copies of consumer checks, which included names, addresses, telephone 
numbers, payment amounts, bank names and routing numbers, and bank account numbers (“copied checks”). 
Id. 
 106.  Id. at 4. “Peer-to-Peer (P2P) technology is a way to share music, video and documents, play games, 
and facilitate online telephone conversations. The technology enables computers using the same or compatible 
P2P programs to form a network and share digital files directly with other computers on the network. Because 
virtually anyone can join a P2P network just by installing particular software, millions of computers could be 
connected at one time.” Peer-to-Peer File Sharing: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
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installed on a computer in its billing department no later than 2006.107 In October 
2012, Sacramento police found individuals in possession of an “insurance aging 
file,” or “1718 file,”108 from LabMD, which included “personal information, such as 
names and SSNs, of several hundred consumers in different states.”109 The FTC 
conceded in its complaint, filed in August 2013, that “[m]any of these consumers 
were not included in the P2P insurance aging file, and some of the information 
post-dates the P2P insurance aging file,” but argued that “[a] number of the SSNs 
in the Day Sheets are being, or have been, used by people with different names, 
which may indicate that the SSNs have been used by identity thieves.”110 The FTC 
alleged that LabMD: 
 did not develop, implement, or maintain a comprehensive security 
program;111 
 did not use readily available measures to identify commonly known 
and foreseeable risks;112 
 did not prevent employees from unnecessarily accessing personal 
information;113 
 did not adequately train employees to safeguard personal 
information;114 
 did not require common authentication-related security measures;115 





 107.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 108.  Id. at 4–5. According to the Complaint, the file “contain[ed] personal information about 
approximately 9,300 consumers, including names, dates of birth, SSNs, CPT codes, and, in many instances, 
health insurance company names, addresses, and policy numbers.” Id. at 4. 
 109.  Id. at 5. 
 110.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 111.  Id. at 3. The Commission specifically alleged that “employees were allowed to send emails with such 
information to their personal email accounts without using readily available measures to protect the 
information from unauthorized disclosure.” Id.  
 112.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. Specifically, the Commission noted LabMD’s failure to use 
“penetration tests.” Id. In a penetration test, computer systems are purposefully hacked to locate weaknesses 
and vulnerabilities. See What is Penetration Testing?, CORE SECURITY, http://www.coresecurity.com/penetration-
testing-overview. 
 113.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 3. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. “Common authentication-related security measures” specifically mentioned by the Commission 
include “periodically changing passwords, prohibiting the use of the same password across applications,” and 
using “two-factor authentication” (combining a user name and a password, or a password and a pin, for 
example). Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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 did not employ readily available measures to prevent or detect 
unauthorized access to computer networks.117 
According to the Commission, these practices, “taken together, failed to provide 
reasonable and appropriate security for personal information on its computer 
networks.”118 The FTC argued that LabMD’s deficient security “caused, or is likely 
to cause, substantial injury to consumers that is not offset by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or competition and is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. This 
practice was, and is, an unfair act or practice.”119 
LabMD subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, 
that “Congress has not given the FTC the power to use its Section 5 ‘unfairness’ 
authority to do what it has done to LabMD here,” and that, “even if Section 5 
authorized the FTC to broadly regulate data-security practices as ‘unfair’ acts or 
practices, [HIPAA] and the Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health Act (HITECH), as interpreted and enforced by HHS, control.”120 
The Commission denied the motion.121 LabMD also filed complaints in the 
Northern District of Georgia and the District of Columbia seeking to enjoin the 
agency proceeding, and an emergency motion in the U.S. Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.122 LabMD dropped the action in the District of Columbia and has so far 
been denied relief in the Northern District of Georgia and at the Eleventh Circuit.123 
In June 2014, LabMD took a bizarre turn when the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee began investigating the FTC’s relationship with 
Tiversa, the cybersecurity firm that alerted LabMD of the security breach and later 
informed the FTC, leading to the investigation.124 After Tiversa employees testified 
 
 117.  Id. at 3. The Commission alleged specifically that LabMD “did not use appropriate measures to 
prevent employees from installing . . . applications or materials that were not needed to perform their jobs,” and 
did not “adequately maintain or review records of activity on its networks.” Id. “As a result, respondent did not 
detect the installation or use of an unauthorized file sharing application on its networks.” Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 5. 
 120.  Motion to Dismiss Complaint With Prejudice and to Stay Administrative Proceedings at 3, In re 
LabMD, 2013 WL 5232775 (F.T.C. Nov. 12, 2013) (No. 9357). 
 121.  See generally Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, In re LabMD, 2013 WL 5232775 (F.T.C. Jan. 16, 2014) 
(No. 9357), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140117labmdorder.pdf. 
 122.  See Evan M. Wooten & Lei Shen, The Curious Case of LabMD New Developments in the “Other” FTC 
Data-Security Case, MAYER BROWN LLP (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g 
=8e53bce4-c048-403c-97e5-deecefe844cf (providing an overview of the tortuous procedural history of the 
LabMD case). 
 123.  See In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.ftc 
.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter.  
 124.  Allegedly, after discovering a document containing personal information on Limewire’s P2P network, 
Tiversa alerted LabMD of the security breach, and offered to sell them “remediation” services to shore up 
security, which services LabMD turned down. See Press Release, House Oversight and Government Reform 
Comm., Issa to FTC Watchdog: Investigate Allegations of Corporate Blackmail (June 18, 2014), 
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to the Oversight Committee that the information given to the FTC concerning 
LabMD may have been inaccurate, Oversight Committee Chairman Darrell Issa 
sent a letter to the Commission’s Inspector General (“IG”) requesting that the IG’s 
office investigate the FTC’s relationship with Tiversa.125 In May 2014, the Oversight 
Committee released its own report on Tiversa, concluding that the company had 
provided incomplete, inconsistent, and/or conflicting information to the FTC.126 
“Instead of acting as the ‘white knight’ the company purports to be, Tiversa often 
acted unethically and sometimes unlawfully after downloading documents 
unintentionally exposed on peer-to-peer networks,” the report argues, claiming that 
Tiversa “routinely provided falsified information to federal government agencies.”127 
As discussed below, Tiversa’s relationship with the FTC has also taken center stage 
in LabMD’s ongoing administrative proceeding, in what has been framed as part 
David vs. Goliath struggle and part Kafka-esque nightmare of a small business 
railroaded by the Leviathan state.128 
B.  FTC v. Wyndham 
Wyndham and its subsidiaries129 license the “Wyndham” name to approximately 90 
hotels under either franchise or management agreements.130 According to these 
 
https://oversight.house.gov/release/issa-ftc-watchdog-investigate-allegations-corporate-blackmail. It is also 
alleged that, when their services were rejected, Tiversa turned LabMD in to the FTC. Id. 
 125.  See House Oversight Notifies FTC of Investigation Into Tiversa and “Less Than Accurate” Information it 
Provided in LabMD Case (Update 1), DATABREACHES.NET (June 12, 2014), https://www.databreaches.net/house-
oversight-notifies-ftc-of-investigation-into-tiversa-and-less-than-accurate-information-it-provided-in-labmd-
case; see also Grant Gross, House Panel Investigating Data Breach Enforcement, COMPUTERWORLD (May 30, 
2014),  http://www.computerworld.com/article/2490055/cybercrime-hacking/house-panel-investigating-ftc-
data-breach-enforcement.html; Brian Mahoney, LabMD Trial Delayed While House Panel Probes Tiversa, 
LAW360 (May 30, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/543238/labmd-trial-delayed-while-house-panel-
probes-tiversa. 
 126.  See Exhibit 1, Respondent LabMD, Inc.’s Unopposed Motion to Refer Tiversa, Inc., Tiversa Holding 
Corp., and Robert Boback for Investigation Regarding Potential Criminal Violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1320D-6(a), 
18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001, 1030, 1505, and 1519 at 4, In re LabMD, 2013 WL 5232775 (F.T.C. June 19, 2015) (No. 
9357), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/577890.pdf. 
 127.  Id. at 5. 
 128.  See Kent Hoover, LabMD CEO Michael Daugherty fights ‘The Devil Inside the Beltway,’ THE BUSINESS 
JOURNALS (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/washingtonbureau/2013/09/13/medical-
testing-lab-fights-the-devil.html. In particular, see former LabMD CEO Michael Daugherty’s book about his 
experiences with Tiversa and the FTC. MICHAEL J. DAUGHERTY, THE DEVIL INSIDE THE BELTWAY: THE SHOCKING 
EXPOSE OF THE US GOVERNMENT’S SURVEILLANCE AND OVERREACH INTO CYBERSECURITY, MEDICINE AND SMALL 
BUSINESS (Broadland, 2013). 
 129.  The complaint lists Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Wyndham Hotel Group LLC, Wyndham 
Hotels and Resorts LLC, and Wyndham Hotel Management. Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 1. Under 
Wyndham’s business structure, Hotels and Resorts and Hotel Management are subsidiaries of Hotel Group. Id. 
at 4. 
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agreements, Wyndham-branded hotels are required to purchase and configure 
computer systems designed for, among other things, handling reservations and 
payment card transactions.131 Specifically, each hotel’s computer system, known as a 
“property management system,” stores consumers’ personal information, 
“including names, addresses, email addresses, telephone numbers, payment card 
account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.”132 The networks of all 
Wyndham-branded hotels are linked to the company’s corporate network, 
including a “central reservation system” that “coordinates reservations across the 
Wyndham brand.”133 
Between April 2008 and January 2010, hackers gained access three separate times 
to Wyndham’s network, including Wyndham-branded hotels’ individual property 
management systems, and stole “more than 619,000 payment card account 
numbers.”134 The payment card numbers were subsequently posted to a domain 
registered in Russia, and the breaches, according to the FTC, cost consumers “more 
than $10.6 million in fraud loss.”135 In its complaint, filed in August 2012, the FTC 
alleged that Wyndham: 
 did not limit access between hotel networks and the Internet;136 
 allowed payment card information to be stored in clear, readable 
text;137 
 did not ensure Wyndham-branded hotels implemented adequate 
security policies and procedures prior to connecting local computers 
to Wyndham’s network;138 
 
 130.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 608 (D.N.J. 2014) (“Hotels and Resorts 
licensed the ‘Wyndham’ name to approximately seventy-five independently-owned hotels under franchise 
agreements. Similarly, Hotel Management licensed the ‘Wyndham’ name to approximately fifteen 
independently-owned hotels under management agreements.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 608 (“[A]lthough certain Wyndham-branded hotels have their own websites, customers making 
reservations for these hotels ‘are directed back to Hotels and Resorts’ website to make reservations.”). 
 134.  Id. at 609. In the first attack, occurring in April, 2008, on a local hotel in Phoenix, hackers used “brute 
force” attack where hackers use computer programs to systematically guess all possible passwords. Wyndham 
Complaint, supra note 2, at 13. The first hack resulted in the compromise of 500,000 payment card numbers, 
which were exported to a domain in Russia. Id. at 15. The second attack occurred in March 2009, when hackers 
gained access through a service provider’s administrator account in the company’s data center in Phoenix. Id. 
The second hack resulted in the compromise of 50,000 customer payment cards. Id. at 16. The third attack 
occurred in late 2009; hackers again gained access to Wyndham’s networks through a service provider 
administrator’s account. Id. The breach resulted in the compromise of 69,000 payment card accounts. Id. at 16–
17.  
 135.  Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d at 609. 
 136.  First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief at 10, F.T.C. v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D.N.J. 2014) (No. CV 12-1365-PHX-PGR). 
 137.  Id. 
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 did not remedy known vulnerabilities on hotel servers;139 
 allowed servers to connect to Wyndham’s network, despite the fact 
that well-known default user IDs and passwords were enabled on 
the servers;140 
 did not employ common user ID and password security measures;141 
 did not adequately inventory computers connected to Wyndham’s 
network;142 
 did not employ reasonable measures to detect and prevent 
unauthorized access;143 
 did not follow proper incident response procedures;144 and 
 did not adequately restrict third-party vendors’ access to the 
network.145 
According to the Commission, these practices, “taken together, unreasonably 
and unnecessarily exposed consumers’ personal data to unauthorized access and 
theft.”146 On the basis of these alleged failures, the FTC argued Wyndham’s actions 
“caused or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that consumers 
cannot reasonably avoid themselves and that is not outweighed by countervailing 
benefits to consumers or competition,” and therefore constituted unfair acts under 
Section 5.147 The Commission asked the court for (1) a permanent injunction to 
prevent future violations, (2) “such relief as the Court finds necessary to redress 
injury to consumers resulting from Defendants’ violations of the FTCA, including 
but not limited to, rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of 
 
 138.  Id. at 10–11. 
 139.  Id. at 11. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 11. 
 142.  Id. at 11. 
 143.  Id. at 12. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 10. 
 147.  Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 19. Unlike in LabMD, discussed below, the FTC also alleged 
Wyndham violated the deceptiveness prong. See infra Section III.E. The portion of Wyndham’s privacy policy 
the FTC considered deceptive, and included in the First Amended Complaint, stated, notably:  
We safeguard our Customers’ personally identifiable information by using standard industry 
practices. Although “guaranteed security” does not exist on or off the Internet, we take 
commercially reasonable efforts to create and maintain “fire walls” and other appropriate 
safeguards to ensure that to the extent we control the Information, the Information is used only as 
authorized by us and consistent with this Policy, and that the Information is not improperly altered 
or destroyed. 
Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 9 (replicating langauge from the “Hotel and Resorts’” website, but not 
providing a specific citation to the quoted language). 
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monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten monies”; and (3) the FTC’s 
litigation costs.148 
Wyndham subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, 
that Congress has, in statutes like the FCRA, the GLBA, and COPPA, granted the 
FTC authority to regulate data security standards, “but only in certain specific, 
limited contexts,” and that these statutes “are powerful evidence that the FTC lacks 
authority to regulate data-security practices in cases (like this one) that fall outside 
the confines of those narrow delegations.”149 The District Court denied Wyndham’s 
motion, concluding that “subsequent data-security legislation seems to 
complement—not preclude—the FTC’s authority,” and that “the FTC’s unfairness 
authority over data security can coexist with the existing data-security regulatory 
scheme.”150 Wyndham subsequently appealed.151 
C.  Wyndham at the Third Circuit 
In March of 2015, the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in 
the Wyndham case, and in August the court issued its opinion.152 Two questions 
were before the court:  (1) “[W]hether the FTC has authority to regulate 
cybersecurity under the unfairness prong of [Section 5]; and, if so, (2) whether 
Wyndham had fair notice its specific cybersecurity practices could fall short of that 
provision.”153  
1.  The FTC’s Unfairness Authority 
First, the court rejected Wyndham’s argument that conduct is only unfair when it 
injures consumers “through unscrupulous or unethical behavior,” noting that the 
Supreme Court in Sperry & Hutchinson had rejected the view that all three factors 
from the FTC’s policy statement are necessary to a showing of “unfairness,” and the 
third factor, whether the act causes substantial injury to consumers, is sufficient for 
a finding of unfairness.154  
 
 148.  Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 20. 
 149.  Motion to Dismiss at 9, F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., 2012 WL 3916987 (D. Ariz. Aug. 
27, 2012) (No. 12-1365) [hereinafter Wyndham Motion to Dismiss]. 
 150.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 613 (D.N.J. 2014). 
 151.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (Wyndham II), 799 F.3d 236, 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 152.  Id. at 259 (concluding that Wyndham failed to successfully challenge the FTC’s claim). 
 153.  Id. at 240. The Court noted that Wyndham also argued in its brief that the FTC failed the pleading 
requirements of an unfairness claim, but declined to address the question, since interlocutory appeal was not 
granted on the issue. Id. at 240 n.1. 
 154.  Id. at 244–45; see also Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20–21, F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. 799 
F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3514), 2014 WL 5106183 (C.A.3) [hereinafter Wyndham Opening App. Brief]; 
Cigarette Rule Statement, supra note 49, at 8355. 
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Next, the court took up Wyndham’s argument that the plain meaning of the 
word “unfair” requires that the FTC take into account more than whether an act or 
practice causes substantial injury to consumers.155 Citing the Webster’s Dictionary 
definition of “unfair” (“marked by injustice, partiality, or deception”), Wyndham 
argued in its opening brief that “[a] business treats consumers ‘unfairly,’” not when 
it simply causes harm, but “when it seeks to take advantage of [customers], or 
otherwise injures them through unscrupulous or unethical behavior.”156 Wyndham 
also argued that “[a]s a matter of law and logic, a business does not treat its 
customers in an ‘unfair’ manner when the business itself is victimized by 
criminals.”157  
The court’s rejection of the latter argument was straightforward, drawing on tort 
principles to explain that a company may be held accountable for negligent 
behavior that results in injury to a company and a consumer, even if the harm is 
precipitated by the criminality of a third party and “that a company’s conduct was 
not the most proximate cause of an injury generally does not immunize liability 
from foreseeable harms.”158 The court’s rejection of the former argument—that 
“unfair” behavior must be “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception”—was 
more creative. Pouncing on Wyndham’s dictionary definition, the court issued a 
sharp rebuke of Wyndham’s cybersecurity practices: 
A company does not act equitably when it publishes a privacy policy to 
attract customers who are concerned about data privacy, fails to make good 
on that promise by investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity, exposes 
its unsuspecting customers to substantial financial injury, and retains the 
profits of their business.159 
Effectively folding the “deceptiveness” prong of Section 5 into its unfairness 
analysis, the court acknowledged that its rebuke “encompasses some facts relevant 
to the FTC’s deceptive practices claim,” but argued that “facts relevant to unfairness 
 
 155.  See Wydham II, 799 F.3d at 244–45. 
 156.  Wyndham Opening App. Brief, supra note 154, at 20–21. 
 157.  Id. at 21. 
 158.  See Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 246. In reaching this conclusion, the Court cited the Second Restatement 
of Torts: “If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards 
which makes the actor negligent, such an act[,] whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or 
criminal[,] does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused thereby.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 449 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Washington Suburban Sanitary 
Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 688 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548, 556 (Md. 1976)) (“Proximate 
cause may be found even where the conduct of the third party is . . . criminal, so long as the conduct was 
facilitated by the first party and reasonably foreseeable, and some ultimate harm was reasonably foreseeable.”). 
 159.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 245. 
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and deception claims frequently overlap.”160 Somewhat surprisingly, and perhaps 
importantly, for future cases, the court collapsed Section 5’s two prongs: “We 
cannot completely disentangle the two theories here.”161 
Third, the court rejected Wyndham’s contention that “cybersecurity is no 
different in kind from physical security,” and that endorsement of the FTC’s 
present tactics vis-à-vis cybersecurity would give the Commission “authority to 
regulate the locks on hotel room doors,” to “require every store in the land to post 
an armed guard at the door,”162 or to sue supermarkets that are “sloppy about 
sweeping up banana peels.”163 After dismissing Wyndham’s argument as “alarmist,” 
the court concluded that, in any event, given the number of people implicated by 
the cyber attacks, Wyndham’s were empty comparisons: “[this argument] invites 
the tart retort that, were Wyndham a supermarket, leaving so many banana peels all 
over the place that 619,000 customers fall hardly suggests it should be immune from 
liability under [Section 5].”164 
Having concluded that Wyndham’s conduct fell within the plain meaning of 
“unfair,” the court then confronted Wyndham’s contention that Congress’ passage 
of the FCRA, COPPA, and the GLBA has reshaped Section 5’s meaning to exclude 
cybersecurity.165 In its brief, Wyndham argued that in each of these statutes 
Congress granted the FTC authority to regulate cybersecurity in specific types of 
situations, and “[t]hese tailored grants of substantive authority to the FTC in the 
cybersecurity field would be inexplicable if the Commission already had general 
 
 160.  Id. (citing Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. F.T.C., 767 F.2d 957, 980 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1985)) (“The FTC has 
determined that . . . making unsubstantiated advertising claims may be both an unfair and a deceptive 
practice.”). 
 161.  Id. at 245. The Court seemed aware of the importance of this declaration, and devoted one of the 
longest footnotes in the opinion to defend its merger of the deception and unfairness analyses. See id. at 245 n.4 
(citing Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1060 (1984)) (“[U]nfairness is the set of general principles of which 
deception is a particularly well-established and streamlined subset.”); In re Figgie Int’l, 107 F.T.C. 313, 373 n.5 
(1986) (“[U]nfair practices are not always deceptive but deceptive practices are always unfair.”). Additionally, 
the Court qouted FTC staff member J. Howard Beales’ statement on unfairness authority. Wyndham II, 799 
F.3d at 245 n.4 (“Although, in the past, they have sometimes been viewed as mutually exclusive legal theories, 
Commission precedent incorporated in the statutory codification makes clear that deception is properly viewed 
as a subset of unfairness.” (quoting Beales, supra note 12)); see also Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts 
or Practices” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 265 (1981) (“Although deception 
is generally regarded as a separate aspect of section 5, in its underlying rationale it is really just one specific form 
of unfair consumer practice.”). 
 162.  Wyndham Opening App. Brief, supra note 154, at 22–23.  
 163.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 246; see also Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3514), 2014 WL 7036128 [hereinafter Wyndham Reply Brief]. 
 164.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 247. 
 165.  Id. For a brief explanation of the FCRA, COPPA, and the GLBA, see supra notes 69–71 and 
accompanying text.  
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substantive authority over this field [in Section 5].”166 The court countered that, in 
each of these statutes, Congress granted the Commission authorities above and 
beyond those emanating from Section 5: specifically, the FCRA required, rather 
than authorized, the FTC to issue regulations concerning cybersecurity and 
expanded the scope of the FTC’s cybersecurity authority;167 the GLBA similarly 
required the FTC to issue regulations and “relieves some of the burdensome 
[Section 5] requirements for declaring acts unfair”;168 and the Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act required the FTC to issue regulations “and empowered it to 
do so under the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, rather than the 
more burdensome Magnuson-Moss procedures under which the FTC must usually 
issue regulations.”169 Because each of these statutes goes a little farther than Section 
5, none of them would have been “inexplicable” if the FTC already had authority to 
regulate cybersecurity through Section 5.170 
Finally, the court rejected Wyndham’s contention that the FTC’s interpretation 
of Section 5 was “inconsistent with its repeated efforts to obtain from Congress the 
very authority it purports to wield here.”171 Citing the testimony of various FTC 
officials in Congressional hearings, as well as the FTC’s 2000 Report to Congress 
recommending cybersecurity legislation, Wyndham argued that “[f]or over a 
decade, the FTC has lobbied in favor of legislation that would establish substantive 
federal cybersecurity standards for American business, and give the FTC the 
 
 166.  Wyndham Opening App. Brief, supra note 154, at 25. In support for the proposition that Congress’ 
grant of specific regulatory authority suggests that the agency does not have a more general regulatory authority 
over the same conduct, Wyndham cited several Supreme Court cases. For example, see FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (“The classic judicial task of reconciling many laws 
enacted over time, and getting them to make sense in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of 
a statute may be altered by the implications of a later statute. This is particularly so where the scope of the 
earlier statute but the subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at hand.”); United States v. Estate 
of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530–31 (1998) (“[A] specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control 
our construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly amended.”); West Va. Univ. 
Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) (“[I]t is our role to make sense rather than nonsense out of the 
corpus juris.”). 
 167.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 248 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (2012)) (“The Federal Trade Commission . . . 
shall issue final regulations”); 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(e)(1)(B) (“The [FTC and other agencies] shall jointly . . . 
prescribe regulations requiring each financial institution . . . .”). 
 168.  See Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 248 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2011)) (“[The FTC] shall establish 
appropriate standards . . . to protect against unauthorized access to or use of . . . records . . . which could result 
in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.”). As evidence of how the GLBA unburdens the FTC of 
Section 5’s requirements, the Court cited § 6801(b) of the GLBA, “[The FTC] shall establish appropriate 
standards . . . to protect against unauthorized access to or use of . . . records . . . which could result in substantial 
harm or inconvenience to any customer.” 15 U.S.C. §6801(b) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 169.  Id. at 248 (internal citations omitted). 
 170.  Id. at 247. 
 171.  Id. at 248 (quoting Wyndham Opening App. Brief, supra note 154, at 28). 
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authority to enforce those standards.”172 Identifying FCC testimony to the same 
effect, the court concluded that the FTC’s requests for codification of the broad 
“fair information practice principles” did not amount to an admission that it did 
not have authority to prosecute cybersecurity cases under Section 5’s “unfairness” 
prong.173 
2.  Fair Notice 
With respect to the second question certified for review, whether Wyndham had 
fair notice it could be targeted by the FTC for its cybersecurity practices, the court 
first delineated the various standards for fair notice, depending on the type of 
case.174 Critically, the court had to determine whether there was an FTC rule or 
adjudication regarding the application of Section 5’s unfairness prong to 
cybersecurity, in which case Wyndham was entitled to “ascertainable certainty” of 
the FTC’s interpretation of what specific cybersecurity practices are required by 
Section 5,175 or whether, in the absence of an applicable regulation or adjudication, 
Wyndham was only entitled to fair notice that its conduct could fall within the 
meaning of the statute.176 In concluding there was no applicable regulation or 
 
 172.  Wyndham Opening App. Brief, supra note 154, at 28; see 2000 Report, supra note 62, at 34. See generally 
Consumer Data Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy 
& Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm’r, FTC); Data Theft Issues: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of David C. Vladeck, Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection). 
 173.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 248–249. 
 174.  Id. at 249–55. The critical issue with respect to “fair notice” in this context was whether a defendant 
had fair notice of a court’s, or an agency’s, interpretation of a particular statute. The court differentiated 
between fair notice standards in at least five different types of cases: (1) criminal cases, (2) civil cases involving 
statutes governing economic behavior, (3) cases where an agency is administering a statute without conferring 
new rights or obligations, (4) cases where an agency issues regulations to fill in a statutory gap, and (5) cases 
where an agency is interpreting its own regulation. Id. 
 175.  Id. at 253–54. 
 176.  Id. at 253. The court explained that the reason for the difference between fair notice standards for cases 
where the agency is interpreting a statute (in promulgating regulations or adjudicating a case) and fair notice 
standards where the agency is merely administering a statute: 
A higher standard of fair notice applies in the second and third contexts than in the typical civil 
statutory interpretation case because agencies engage in interpretation differently than courts. In 
resolving ambiguity in statutes or regulations, courts generally adopt the best or most reasonable 
interpretation. But, as the agency is often free to adopt any reasonable construction, it may impose 
higher legal obligations than required by the best interpretation. 
 Furthermore, courts generally resolve statutory ambiguity by applying traditional methods of 
construction. Private parties can reliably predict the court’s interpretation by applying the same 
methods. In contrast, an agency may also rely on technical expertise and political values. It is harder 
to predict how an agency will construe a statute or regulation at some unspecified point in the 
future, particularly when that interpretation will depend on the “political views of the President in 
office at [that] time.” 
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adjudication preceding Wyndham’s alleged violation of Section 5, the court turned 
Wyndham’s own argument on its head, citing seven different places, in court filings 
and oral argument, where Wyndham had asserted that the FTC’s motion to dismiss 
order in LabMD (the potential prior adjudication on which Wyndham focused its 
argument) did not merit deference by the court.177 Because Wyndham was, in other 
words, “asking the federal courts to interpret [Section 5] in the first instance to 
decide whether it prohibits the alleged conduct here,” Wyndham was not entitled to 
“ascertainable certainty” about the FTC’s interpretation of Section 5, only fair 
notice of whether its conduct may have been deemed unfair under Section 5 (as 
determined by a court).178 
Having dispatched Wyndham’s “ascertainable certainty” arguments, the court 
turned to what fair notice standard applied, concluding that, because the case 
involved a civil statute governing economic activity, the relevant inquiry was 
whether the unfairness prong of Section 5 was “so vague as to be ‘no rule or 
standard at all.’”179 In determining that the statute was not in fact “so vague,” the 
court noted that Section 5 “asks whether ‘the act or practice causes or is likely to 
cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers 
or to competition’”180:  
While far from precise, this standard informs parties that the relevant 
inquiry here is a cost-benefit analysis that considers a number of relevant 
factors, including the probability and expected size of reasonably 
unavoidable harms to consumers given a certain level of cybersecurity and 
the costs to consumers that would arise from investment in stronger 
cybersecurity.181 
 
Id. at 251–52. 
 177.  Id. at 252–54. 
 178.  Id. at 253, 255 (“For now, however, it is enough to say that we accept Wyndham’s forceful contention 
that we are interpreting the FTC Act (as the District Court did). As a necessary consequence, Wyndham is only 
entitled to notice of the meaning of the statute and not to the agency’s interpretation of the statute.”). 
 179.  Id. at 255 (citations omitted) (“Wyndham is entitled to a relatively low level of statutory notice for 
several reasons. [Section 5] does not implicate any constitutional rights here. It is a civil rather than criminal 
statute. And statutes regulating economic activity receive a ‘less strict’ test because their ‘subject matter is often 
more narrow, and because businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully, can be 
expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action.’ In this context, the relevant legal rule is not ‘so 
vague as to be “no rule or standard at all.”’”).  
 180.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 255. 
 181.  Id. at 255–56 (citations omitted) (“We acknowledge there will be borderline cases where it is unclear if 
a particular company’s conduct falls below the requisite legal threshold. But under a due process analysis a 
company is not entitled to such precision as would eliminate all close calls. Fair notice is satisfied here as long as 
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Treating Wyndham’s as an “as-applied” challenge, the court noted that the FTC 
did not merely allege that Wyndham had used weak firewalls, IP address 
restrictions, encryption software, and passwords, but, instead, “that Wyndham 
failed to use any firewall at critical network points, did not restrict specific IP 
addresses at all, did not use any encryption for certain customer files, and did not 
require some users to change their default or factory-setting passwords at all.”182 
The court also leaned on the fact that Wyndham was hacked “not one or two, but 
three, times”— “At least after the second attack,” the court said, “it should have 
been painfully clear to Wyndham that a court could find its conduct failed the cost-
benefit analysis.”183 
Additionally, the court highlighted that the FTC had filed a number of 
complaints and issued a number of consent decrees defining the contours of what 
constitutes acceptable data security practices, in addition to issuing a data security 
guidebook in 2007 which included advice that would have prevented or mitigated 
the damage from Wyndham’s failures.184 
Finally, the court rejected, on two grounds, Wyndham’s argument that the FTC’s 
complaint was too vague because it failed to delineate which specific cybersecurity 
practices triggered the Section 5 violation, instead lumping together a number of 
practices that, taken together, fail the cost-benefit analysis.185 First, the court 
concluded that “even if the complaints do not specify which allegations . . . form the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of the alleged violation, they can still help 
companies apprehend the possibility of liability under the statute.”186 Second, the 
court compared the FTC’s complaint against Wyndham to an earlier, analogous 
case against CardSystems Solutions in 2006: “Wyndham cannot argue that the 
complaints fail to give notice of the necessary and sufficient conditions of an alleged 
 
the company can reasonably foresee that a court could construe its conduct as falling within the meaning of the 
statute.”). 
 182.  Id. at 256 (citations omitted). 
 183.  Id. Because the relevant issue is whether Wyndham was on fair notice that its actions could fall within 
the ambit of Section 5, the court left unanswered the fact question of whether Wyndham’s practices were 
actually unfair under Section 5. Id. (“We leave for another day whether Wyndham’s alleged cybersecurity 
practices do in fact fail, an issue the parties did not brief.”). 
 184.  Id. at 257 (“That the FTC commissioners . . . believe that alleged cybersecurity practices fail the cost-
benefit analysis of [Section 5] certainly helps companies with similar practices apprehend the possibility that 
their cybersecurity could fail as well.”); Gerald J. Ferguson & Alan L. Friel, Challenging FTC Regulation of Cyber-
security After FTC v. Wyndham, DATA PRIVACY MONITOR BLOG, (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www. 
dataprivacymonitor.com/cybersecurity/challenging-ftc-regulation-of-cyber-security-after-ftc-v-wyndham 
(quoting Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 257 n.22) (“The consent orders, which admit no liability and which focus on 
prospective requirements on the defendant, were of little use to it in trying to understand the specific 
requirements imposed by § 45(a).”). 
 185.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d at 258.  
 186.  Id.  
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§ 45(a) violation when all of the allegations in at least one of the relevant four or 
five complaints have close corollaries here.”187 
D.  Wyndham Settles 
Although Wyndham vowed to continue fighting after the Third Circuit’s ruling, a 
little more than three months later, the company settled the case.188 “This settlement 
marks the end of a significant case in the FTC’s efforts to protect consumers from 
the harm caused by unreasonable data security,” said FTC Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez.189 “Not only will it provide important protection to consumers, but the 
court rulings in the case have affirmed the vital role the FTC plays in this important 
area.”190 
The settlement, outlined in a stipulated order from the district court, did not 
require Wyndham to pay any monetary penalties, but the terms nevertheless 
illustrate the long-term burden faced by a company that loses a cybersecurity case 
brought by the Commission.191 The company is required to establish a 
comprehensive information security program designed to protect cardholder data, 
including payment card numbers, names and expiration dates.192 In addition, the 
company is required to conduct annual information security audits and maintain 
safeguards in connections to its franchisees’ servers which conform to the Payment 
Card Industry Data Security Standards.193 The settlement also requires Wyndham’s 
 
 187.  Id.  
 188.  Press Release, Jessica Rich, Dir., Fed. Trade Comm’n, Bureau of Consumer Prot., Wyndham Settles 
FTC Charges It Unfairly Placed Consumers’ Payment Card Information At Risk (Dec. 9, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/wyndham-settles-ftc-charges-it-unfairly-placed-
consumers-payment [hereinafter Rich, Press Release]; see also Sophia Pearson, Wyndham Must Face Hacker Suit 
as Court Upholds FTC Power, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-
24/wyndham-must-face-ftc-suit-for-failing-to-stop-russian-hackers (“Once the discovery process resumes, we 
believe the facts will show the FTC’s allegations are unfounded . . . Safeguarding personal information remains a 
top priority for our company and, with the dramatic increase in the number and severity of cyberattacks on 
both public and private institutions, we believe consumers will be best served by the government and businesses 
working together collaboratively rather than as adversaries.”). 
 189.  Rich, Press Release, supra note 188. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See Stipulated Order for Injunction at 4–14, Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp, et 
al., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602 (D. N.J. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-JAD) [hereinafter Wyndham’s Stipulated 
Order]. 
 192.  Id.; see also Daren Orzechowski & Thomas Cockriel, FTC and Wyndham Settle Suit Regarding 
Wyndham’s Alleged Cybersecurity Failures, WHITE & CASE TECH. NEWS FLASH (Jan. 19, 2016), 
http://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/ftc-and-wyndham-settle-suit-regarding-wyndhams-alleged-
cybersecurity-failures. 
 193.  See PCI Security, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2017). The PCI Security Standards Council was founded in 2006 by American Express, 
Discover, JCB International, MasterCard and Visa Inc., for the promotion of security standards in the payment 
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audit to: (1) certify the “untrusted” status of certain franchisee networks, to prevent 
future hackers from using the same methods; (2) implement a formal risk 
assessment process for analyzing the possible data security risks faced by the 
company; and (3) certify that the auditor is “qualified, independent and free from 
conflicts of interest.”194 
In the event Wyndham suffers another data breach affecting more than 10,000 
payment card numbers, the company must obtain an assessment of the breach and 
provide that assessment to the FTC within 10 days.195 Wyndham must submit to the 
FTC a compliance report describing the activities the company has taken to comply 
with the stipulated order and, during the 10 years after filing, submit notice of any 
change in the structure of Wyndham or any Wyndham subsidiary that may affect 
compliance with the obligations under the settlement.196 The settlement provides 
that if Wyndham successfully obtains the necessary compliance certifications, it will 
be deemed in compliance with the comprehensive information security program 
provision of the order.197 Wyndham’s obligations under the settlement are in place 
for 20 years.198 
 
E.  LabMD at the Eleventh Circuit? 
 
Although the Third Circuit’s endorsement of the FTC’s use of the unfairness 
doctrine in Wyndham was significant, it is unlikely the case will be the last word on 
the issue. Indeed, it looks increasingly like LabMD will be the next chance federal 
courts have to sound off on the FTC’s cybersecurity tactics: in July 2016, the 
Commission voted to overturn the ruling of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 
granting LabMD’s motion to have the FTC’s action dismissed—the ALJ issued the 
ruling on the grounds that the FTC had failed to show LabMD’s security practices 
caused or were likely to cause substantial harm199—ripening the case for review 
before the Eleventh Circuit.200  
 
card industry. Id. The organization lists its two priorities as, “[h]elping merchants and financial institutions 
understand and implement standards for security policies, technologies and ongoing processes that protect their 
payment systems from breaches and theft of cardholder data,” and “[h]elping vendors understand and 
implement standards for creating secure payment solutions.” Id. 
 194.  Rich, Press Release, supra note 188. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Wyndham’s Stipulated Order, supra note 191, at 12. 
 197.  Rich, Press Release, supra note 188. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Administrative Law Judge Dismisses FTC Data Security 
Complaint Against Medical Testing Laboratory LabMD, Inc. (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2015/11/administrative-law-judge-dismisses-ftc-data-security-complaint; Initial Decision, 
In re LabMD Inc., No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *3 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) vacated by Public Opinion of the 
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Critical to the ALJ’s ruling, issued in November of 2015, was the suspect 
evidence of harm offered by Tiversa, the cyber intelligence company that first 
brought the alleged security breach to LabMD’s, and then the FTC’s, attention.201 
The judge noted that the FTC’s decision to launch an investigation and prosecute 
LabMD rested on evidence from Tiversa that the 1718 file had been compromised, 
and also highlighted the Oversight Committee’s report on Tiversa, in addition to 
the testimony of a former Tiversa employee that Tiversa had manipulated evidence 
to try and get LabMD’s business, and then, when LabMD rejected their offer, 
reported the company to the FTC in retaliation.202 Reviewing the expert testimony 
from both sides, the judge concluded that the FTC had failed to show that 
consumers had suffered, or were likely to suffer, substantial injury as a result of 
LabMD’s alleged security failures.203 
The following July, a full panel of commissioners voted to overturn the 
dismissal, finding that the Commission did not need to show the kind of tangible 
injuries required by the ALJ.204 In a 37-page opinion, FTC Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez wrote: “The ALJ held that ‘privacy harms, allegedly arising from an 
unauthorized exposure of sensitive medical information . . . unaccompanied by any 
tangible injury such as monetary harm or health and safety risks, [do] not 
constitute “substantial injury” within the meaning of Section 5(n).’ We disagree.”205 
Central to the Commission’s case was the fact that Tiversa had obtained the file; 
Ramirez explained: 
 It is undisputed that the 1718 file contained names, dates of birth, social 
security numbers, insurance company names, policy numbers, and codes for 
laboratory tests performed, including tests for HIV, herpes, prostate cancer, 
and testosterone levels. We also know that the file was downloaded by at 
least one unauthorized third-party – Tiversa – and then shared with an 
academic researcher.206 
 
Commission, In re LabMd, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016) [hereinafter LabMD 
Dismissal].  For discussion of the substantial harm factor, see supra Section II.B. 
 200.  Public Opinion of the Commission at 1, In re LabMd, Inc., No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 
28, 2016) [hereinafter Wyndham, Opinion of Commission]. 
 201.  See LabMD Dismissal, supra note 199, at 6–7. 
 202.  See id. at 6–11. 
 203.  Id. at 69 (“For all the foregoing reasons, the evidence fails to prove that consumers whose information 
was contained in the 1718 File have suffered, or are likely to suffer, substantial injury as a result of the exposure 
of the 1718 File. Therefore, the exposure of the 1718 File does not support Complaint Counsel’s assertion that 
Respondent’s data security practices are likely to cause substantial consumer harm.”). 
 204.  Wyndham Opinion of Commission, supra note 200, at 17. 
 205.  Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 206.  Id. (citations omitted). 
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Although the FTC has not, to date, shown that the leak of the 1718 file resulted 
in identity theft, the Commission noted that this was irrelevant: what matters is 
whether LabMD’s practices were likely to result in injury.207 Moreover, the likely 
injury need not be monetary.208 According to Ramirez, the mere possibility of 
disclosure of medical information and subsequent “embarrassment” is enough to 
bring a Section 5 claim: 
 We conclude that the disclosure of sensitive health or medical information 
causes additional harms that are neither economic nor physical in nature 
but are nonetheless real and substantial and thus cognizable under Section 
5(n). For instance, Complaint Counsel’s expert, Rick Kam, testified that 
disclosure of the mere fact that medical tests were performed irreparably 
breached consumers’ privacy, which can involve “embarrassment or other 
negative outcomes, including reputational harm.209 
Obviously, this is different from the theft of payment card numbers by Russian 
hackers and estimated millions of dollars in fraud loss alleged in Wyndham.210 
In late September 2016, a request for the Commission to stay the effective date of 
its action against LabMD pending planned appeals to the Eleventh Circuit was 
denied,211 but a subsequent stay request to the Eleventh Circuit was granted in 
November.212  
 
 207.  Id. (“Complaint Counsel introduced evidence of a range of harms that can and often do result from 
the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive personal information of the types contained in the 1718 file.”). 
 208.  See id. 
 209.  Id.  
 210.  Also central to Ramirez’s argument was the notion that the FTC treats medical information differently. 
Opinion of Commission, supra note 201, at 18 (“Indeed, the Commission has long recognized that the 
unauthorized release of sensitive medical information harms consumers.” (first citing F.T.C. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
133 F.T.C. 763, 767–68 (2002); then citing Complaint at 4, In re GMR Transcription Services, Inc., 2014 WL 
4252393 (Aug. 14, 2014))). Ramirez also noted the “broad recognition in federal and state law of the inherent 
harm in the disclosure of sensitive health and medical information,” Id. at 18–19 (first citing Health Insurance 
Portability & Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320 (1996); then citing Health Information Technology for 
Economic and Clinical Health Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300jj (2009)). There are heightened protections for medical 
information in federal case law and in tort principles. See, e.g., id. at 19 (first citing Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. 
Ct. 2191, 2202 (2013); then citing Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1513–14 (11th Cir. 1991)); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“As explained by the Restatement of Torts, when 
‘intimate details of [one’s] life are spread before the public gaze in a manner highly offensive to the ordinary 
reasonable man, there is an actionable invasion of his privacy, unless the matter is one of legitimate public 
interest.’”). 
 211.  LabMD, Inc. v. F.T.C., No. 16–16270–D, 2016 WL 8116800, at *2 (11th Cir. Nov. 10, 2016) (reviewing 
LabMd’s requested stay, following the FTC Final Order  that denied the stay); see also Jimmy H. Koo, LabMD 
Wants Stay of Landmark FTC Data Security Ruling, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.bna.com/labmd-wants-stay-n73014447214/?utm_campaign=LEGAL_NWSLTR_Privacy+%26+ 
Data+Security+Law+Update_090716&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua&elqTrackId=ece70288cdce4
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In deciding whether to grant the stay, the Eleventh Circuit focused primarily on 
whether LabMD was likely to prevail on the merits on appeal, and specifically 
whether LabMD’s practice, as the FTC alleges, “causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers” under Section 5.213 The court reasoned that “[t]he 
FTC’s ruling did not point to any tangible harm to any consumer, because there is 
no evidence that any consumer suffered a harm such as identity theft or physical 
harm,” noting that the harms alleged by the FTC were pinned solely on the 
exposure of the 1718 file.214 The Court then gave two reasons why the FTC’s 
interpretation of Section 5 might be unreasonable. First, the Court argued that it “is 
not clear that a reasonable interpretation of [Section 5] includes intangible harms 
like those that the FTC found in this case.”215 Second, the Court argued that the 
FTC’s holding that “likely to cause” does not mean “probable,” but instead means 
“significant risk,” is not a reasonable interpretation—“[W]e do not read the word 
‘likely’ to include something that has a low likelihood,” the Court reasoned. “We do 
not believe an interpretation that does this is reasonable.”216  
The Court also issued a stark summary of the financial harm LabMD suffered as 
a result of the FTC investigation and ongoing litigation, and the likely irreparable 
harm to LabMD if the stay were not granted, the summary of which is worth 
quoting in full: 
 LabMD is no longer an operational business. It has no personnel and no 
revenue. It now has less than $5,000 cash on hand. It reported a loss of 
$310,243 last fiscal year, and has a pending $1 million judgment against it 
 
f0aa58ff456d2f60732&elq=650ea4e7a16247208ff4b5d2805031f0&elqaid=6271&elqat=1&elqCampaignId=3738 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2016). 
 212.  LabMD, Inc., 2016 WL 8116800, at *1. 
 213.  Id. at *2 (referencing Section 5 of FTC’s authority).  The Court identified four factors that constitute 
the “traditional standard” for considering a stay:  
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;  
(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay 
will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public 
interest lies. 
Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 425–26, 434 (2009)).  The Court went on to specify that, “‘[t]he first 
two factors . . . are the most critical.’”  Id.  
 214.  Id. at *3 (“Instead, the FTC found actual harm here due to the sole fact of the 1718 file’s unauthorized 
disclosure. The FTC also found that consumers suffered a ‘privacy harm’ that may have affected their 
reputations or emotions, which therefore constituted a substantial injury. Alternatively, the FTC found that the 
unauthorized exposure of the 1718 file was likely to cause substantial injury.”). 
 215.  Id. (“LabMD points out that what the FTC here found to be harm is ‘not even “intangible,”’ as a true 
data breach of personal information to the public might be, ‘but rather is purely conceptual’ because this harm 
is only speculative. LabMD has thus made a strong showing that the FTC’s factual findings and legal 
interpretations may not be reasonable.”). 
 216.  Id. at *9. 
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on account of its early termination of its lease. LabMD cannot even afford 
legal representation, and is relying on pro bono services for this appeal.  
 
 Ordinary compliance costs are typically insufficient to render harm 
irreparable. But given LabMD’s bleak outlook, the costs of compliance 
pending appeal would constitute an irreparable harm.217 
The Court’s order, and perhaps even sympathy for LabMD’s plight, is clearly the 
most positive development for the company to date. It is also the strongest evidence 
that the FTC’s unfairness-focused methods of policing cybersecurity could be in 
jeopardy. If, as seems increasingly likely, the case gets a Wyndham-like hearing 
before that court, LabMD may, for several reasons, be a better test of the 
Commission’s application of its unfairness authority to cybersecurity.218  
For one, the case against LabMD does not include allegations of deceptiveness, 
precluding the Eleventh Circuit from following the Third Circuit and folding the 
deceptiveness and unfairness prongs into a single argument.219 As discussed above, 
the fact that Wyndham “publishe[d] a privacy policy to attract customers who 
[we]re concerned about data privacy,” and “fail[ed] to make good on that promise 
by investing inadequate resources in cybersecurity,” was central to the Third 
Circuit’s conclusion that Wyndham had failed to act “equitably.”220 
Second, whereas Wyndham suffered three different security breaches over a two 
year period, “failed to remedy known security vulnerabilities,” and “failed to follow 
proper incident response procedures,”221 the FTC’s case against LabMD centers on 
one security breach caused by a deficiency, the presence of Limewire on an 
employee’s computer, which LabMD remedied immediately upon receiving 
notice.222 As discussed above, the Third Circuit’s conclusion in Wyndham that the 
hotelier was on fair notice depended in part on the fact that Wyndham had suffered 
multiple breaches.223 Although the FTC’s complaint against LabMD mentions 
evidence of a second breach—the “day sheets” discovered by the Sacramento Police 
 
 217.  Id. at *4.  
 218.  See Craig A. Newman, The Long and Wyndham Road: A Settlement in Wyndham and Curve Ball in 
LabMD Signals Storm Warnings for the FTC’s 2016 Data Security Initiatives, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://www.bna.com/long-wyndham-road-n57982065672. For a straightforward critique of the Third Circuit’s 
decision in Wyndham, see Christin S. McMeley, Wyndham: Did The Third Circuit Get It Wrong?, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Sep. 14, 2015), http://www.bna.com/wyndham-third-circuit-n17179935994. 
 219.  Compare Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 18–19, with LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 5. 
 220.  F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (Wyndham II), 799 F.3d 236, 245 (3d Cir. 2015); see supra notes 
135–137. 
 221.  Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 10–12. 
 222.  LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 5 (“Respondent had no business need for Limewire and removed it 
from the billing computer in May 2008, after receiving notice.”).  
 223.  Wyndham II, 799 F.3d. at 256. 
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Department, which contained information post-dating the 1718 file—the FTC does 
not allege that LabMD was aware of any such breach.224  
Third, as discussed above in this section, the LabMD case does not include 
allegations of actual fraud loss, as in Wyndham.225 Granting that the Commission 
only has to show a likelihood of substantial injury to consumers, the LabMD case 
would present a novel question for the Eleventh Circuit, not taken up in Wyndham: 
whether the disclosure of medical information alone, as a result of a cyber breach, 
constitutes a substantial injury for Section 5 purposes. As discussed above, the 
“substantial financial injury” suffered by Wyndham customers was central to the 
Wyndham court’s notion of unfairness.226 
Finally, aside from the fewer number of known breaches, and immediate 
remediation, LabMD, a smaller corporation which has (allegedly) been forced to 
close its doors because of the FTC’s investigation, is generally a more sympathetic 
defendant than Wyndham, as is evidenced by the recent Eleventh Circuit order 
granting the company a stay. If the broad question in Wyndham seemed to be 
whether a large company could be careless with customers’ data while riding off 
into the sunset with their money, the more salient question in LabMD may be 
whether the FTC can shut down any business unlucky enough to be targeted by 
hackers, even where the business immediately redresses its security deficiencies. 
IV.  THE FTC AND PRIVACY BY DESIGN 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Wyndham reaffirms that when a company has been 
careless about its cybersecurity practices and deceived consumers into thinking 
they’re safe, its conduct may be deemed “unfair.” But what if a company hasn’t 
been deceptive? Can the FTC enforce a set of cybersecurity standards purely on the 
basis of what it deems “fair” under Section 5? Would such a broad, “unfairness-
only” regulatory mandate not transform the FTC into the de facto, if not de jure, 
national cybersecurity agency and supplant congressional authority? These 
questions remain unresolved.  
What is clear, for the time being, is that the FTC has continually broadening—
and, now, judicially sanctioned—authority to police cybersecurity under the 
unfairness prong (including deceptiveness as a factor). To what degree the 
Commission will be emboldened by the Third Circuit’s decision remains to be seen, 
but there’s no reason to believe that, as cybersecurity threats continue to grow, the 
FTC won’t continue stepping up policing efforts under the unfairness prong, as it 
has for years. Accordingly, it will be increasingly important for businesses of all sizes 
to comb the FTC’s complaints, consent decrees, guidebooks, congressional reports, 
 
 224.  See LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 2, 4–5. 
 225.  Wyndham Complaint, supra note 2, at 2. 
 226.  See supra note 160–161 and accompanying text.  
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and policy statements to discern exactly what the Commission has in mind 
regarding data security and privacy. Central to understanding the FTC’s vision, this 
paper argues, is understanding “Privacy by Design.” 
A.  What is Privacy by Design? 
Credit for the concept of “Privacy by Design” (also referred to as “PbD”) goes to 
Dr. Ann Cavoukian, formerly the Information and Privacy Commissioner of 
Ontario, Canada, who first introduced the “foundational principles” of PbD in the 
mid-1990s.227 According to Cavoukian, Privacy by Design “advances the view that 
the future of privacy cannot be assured solely by compliance with regulatory 
frameworks; rather, privacy assurance must ideally become an organization’s 
default mode of operation.”228 Elsewhere, Cavoukian has explained that PbD 
“represents a significant shift from traditional approaches to protecting privacy, 
which focus on setting out minimum standards for information management 
practices, and providing remedies for privacy breaches, after-the-fact.”229 Likewise, 
Alexander Dix, Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of 
Information, has described older privacy approaches as being akin to “locking the 
stable door after the horse has bolted.”230  
The seven principles of PbD which, according to Cavoukian’s framework, aim to 
make privacy a priority rather than an afterthought, are: 
 
1. Proactive not Reactive; Preventative not Remedial: “The Privacy 
by Design (PbD) approach is characterized by proactive rather 
than reactive measures. It anticipates and prevents privacy 
invasive events before they happen.” 
2. Privacy as the Default Setting: “Privacy by Design seeks to 
deliver the maximum degree of privacy by ensuring that 
personal data are automatically protected in any given IT system 
or business practice.” 
3. Privacy Embedded into Design Privacy by Design: “Privacy by 
Design is embedded into the design and architecture of IT 
 
 227.  In 2014, Cavoukian left her Commissioner post to become the executive director of the Privacy and 
Big Data Institute at Ryerson University in Ontario. See Ann Cavoukian, PRIVACY & BIG DATA INSTITUTE, 
RYERSON UNIV. (2017), http://www.ryerson.ca/pbdi/about/people/cavoukian.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
The FTC gives Cavoukian credit for the concept in its 2010 and 2012 reports. See 2010 Report, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 66, at v, n.3; 2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 1, n.2. 
 228.  Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design, INFORMATION & PRIVACY COMMISIONER (Jan. 2011), 
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/Resources/7foundationalprinciples.pdf. 
 229.  Ann Cavoukian, 33rd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Report 
on State of PbD, at 3 (2011) [hereinafter Caoukian, Report on State of PbD]. 
 230.  Id.  
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systems and business practices. It is not bolted on as an add-on, 
after the fact.” 
4. Full Functionality: “Privacy by Design seeks to accommodate all 
legitimate interests and objectives in a positive-sum ‘win-win’ 
manner, not through a dated, zero-sum approach, where 
unnecessary trade-offs are made.” 
5. End-to-End Security: “Privacy by Design, having been 
embedded into the system prior to the first element of 
information being collected, extends securely throughout the 
entire lifecycle of the data involved — strong security measures 
are essential to privacy, from start to finish.” 
6. Visibility and Transparency: “Privacy by Design seeks to assure 
all stakeholders that whatever the business practice or 
technology involved, it is in fact, operating according to the 
stated promises and objectives, subject to independent 
verification.” 
7. Respect for User Privacy: “Above all, Privacy by Design requires 
architects and operators to keep the interests of the individual 
uppermost by offering such measures as strong privacy defaults, 
appropriate notice, and empowering user-friendly options.”231 
 
Cavoukian’s PbD principles have become globally recognized standards.232 The 
tipping point perhaps came in October 2010, at the 32nd International Conference 
of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) in Jerusalem, when 
privacy regulators from all over the world passed the “Resolution on Privacy by 
Design,” also known as the “Jerusalem Declaration,” recognizing PbD as “an 
essential component of privacy protection” and resolving to promote Cavoukian’s 
principles.233 
The concept of PbD has proven to be both popular and malleable.234 Microsoft, 
for example, explains on its website that “‘Privacy by Design’ has become a popular 
 
 231.  Id. at 4. 
 232.  See, e.g., Sam Pfeifle, “Privacy by Default” May Be Big Post-Regulation Issue, IAPP, Sep. 30, 2013, 
https://iapp.org/news/ a/privacy-by-default-may-be-big-post-regulation-issue (last visited Apr. 10, 2016) (“At 
this point, ‘Privacy by Design’ is as close to privacy dogma as you’re going to get. Regulatory bodies across the 
globe now provide this idea, developed by Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner Ann Cavoukian, as 
guidance for all technology companies that hope to gather personal information.”). 
 233.  32nd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Resolution on Privacy 
by Design (Oct. 27-29, 2010), https://icdppc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/32-Conference-Israel-resolution-
on-Privacy-by-Design.pdf [hereinafter “Jerusalem Declaration”]. 
 234.  See Kashmir Hill, Why ‘Privacy by Design’ Is the New Corporate Hotness, FORBES (Jul. 28, 2011), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/07/28/why-privacy-by-design-is-the-new-corporate-
hotness/#4388394777de. 
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term in the privacy community, but it means different things to different people,”235 
and lists six different “privacy principles” governing its use of consumer data.236 
Likewise, Article 23 of the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), a comprehensive privacy and data security law first proposed in 2012 and 
formally adopted in late 2015, requires that controllers of the data of EU citizens 
“implement mechanisms for ensuring that, by default, only those personal data are 
processed which are necessary for each specific purpose of the processing and are 
especially not collected or retained beyond the minimum necessary for those 
purposes.”237 Google, Twitter, and Mozilla have all drawn praise for implementing 
PbD-style policies, including most notably default encryption.238 
Finally, several industry-wide and non-profit security initiatives in the private 
sector have also often sought to implement PbD-style privacy recommendations, 
including the PCI Data Security Standards for payment card data,239 the SANS 
Institute’s security policy templates,240 and guidelines for the financial services 
industry provided by BITS, the technology policy division of the Financial Services 
Roundtable.241 
B.  The FTC and PbD 
The FTC first rolled out PbD as an official policy in its 2010 privacy report, as one 
of three components of a “proposed framework” for data security, the other two 
 
 235.  See Our Commitment, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/twc/privacy/commitment.aspx 
[http://web.archive.org/web/20160503113053/https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/twc/privacy/commitment. 
aspx] (last visited May 3, 2016) (“At Microsoft, Privacy by Design describes not only how we build products but 
also how we operate our services and organize ourselves as an accountable technology leader.”). Microsoft 
divides its privacy commitment into four areas: “Practices,” “Policy Activity,” “Research,” and “Privacy 
Models.” Id.  
 236.  Privacy at Microsoft, MICROSOFT, https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-US [http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20170131184655/https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/] (last visited Jan. 31, 2017). 
 237.  Caoukian, Report on State of PbD, supra note 229, at 3.  
 238.  See 2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 25–26 (“Google has cited certain security 
features in its products, including default SSL encryption for Gmail and security features in its Chrome browser. 
Similarly, Mozilla has noted that its cloud storage system encrypts user data using SSL communication. 
Likewise, Twitter has implemented encryption by default for users logged into its system.”); see also Edith 
Ramirez, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy by Design Conference: Privacy By Design 
and the New Privacy Framework of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (June 13, 2012) (listing Google, 
Twitter, Mozilla, Apple’s Safari internet browser, and Microsoft’s X-Box as examples of privacy by design).  
 239.  See supra note 193. 
 240.  Information Security Policy Templates, SANS INSTITUTE, https://www.sans.org/security-
resources/policies (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). The SANS Institute is a non-profit group established in 1989 as “a 
cooperative research and education organization,” for studying and discussing information security. See About, 
SANS INSTITUTE, https://www.sans.org/about (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 241.  See BITS Publications, FIN. SERVS. ROUNDTABLE, at 1–2 http://fsroundtable.org/bits/publications#2 (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
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components being “simplified choice” and “greater transparency.”242 With respect 
to the PbD component, the 2010 Report identified four key “protections” that 
business should build into “their every day business practices”—data security, 
reasonable collection limits, sound retention practices, and data accuracy—as well 
as a fifth procedural principle requiring companies to “maintain comprehensive 
data management procedures throughout the life cycle of their products and 
services.”243 The report did not elaborate extensively on what types of procedures 
would be sufficient, but recommended “assigning personnel to oversee privacy 
issues from the earliest stages of research and development, training employees on 
privacy, and conducting privacy reviews of new products and services.”244 The 
report was the culmination of a year of “roundtables” conducted by the 
Commission with “academics, technologists, privacy experts, consumer advocates, 
representatives from industry, and regulators” about what a data security 
framework should look like.245 After issuing its 2010 report, the FTC received more 
than 450 public comments from various stakeholders, and based on this feedback 
issued a final report in 2012.246 The recommendations in the 2012 Report were 
 
 242.  See 2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 39–41; see also Edith Ramirez, Commissioner, 
Fed.Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Privacy by Design Conference: Privacy By Design and the New Privacy 
Framework of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (June 13, 2012) (“In March, the FTC released a final privacy 
report that clarifies and fine-tunes a framework we first proposed in December 2010. The final FTC report 
espouses three core principles: privacy by design, simplified choice, and transparency.”). 
 243.  2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at ix. On the first PbD protection, “data security,” 
the Commission offered little elaboration beyond asserting that companies should employ reasonable 
safeguards, “including physical, technical, and administrative safeguards,” and that the level of security depends 
on “the sensitivity of the data, the size and nature of a company’s business operations, and the types of risks a 
company faces.” Id. at 44–45. On the need to impose “reasonable collection limits,” the Commission explained 
that “companies should collect only the information needed to fulfill a specific, legitimate business need,” and 
offered several examples. See, e.g., id. (“If a mobile application is providing traffic and weather information to a 
consumer based on his or her location information, it does not need to collect contact lists or call logs from the 
consumer’s device.”). On the point of data retention, the Commission explained that business should retain 
“consumer data for only as long as they have a specific and legitimate business need to do so,” and provided a 
single example, location-based data, which the FTC said could be especially revelatory about a consumer’s 
personal life. Id. at 46–47. On the final protection, data accuracy, the Commission was terse, only asserting that 
companies should take special care where “such data could be used to deny consumers benefits or cause 
significant harm.” Id. at 48.  
 244.  2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 44. 
 245.  Id. at iii–v. In the introduction to the report, the Commission identified several “major themes” that 
emerged from these roundtables: 
[T]he ubiquitous collection and use of consumer data; consumers’ lack of understanding and ability 
to make informed choices about the collection and use of their data; the importance of privacy to 
many consumers; the significant benefits enabled by the increasing flow of information; and the 
blurring of the distinction between personally identifiable information and supposedly anonymous 
or de-identified information. 
Id. at iv. 
 246.  2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at i. 
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substantially similar to those in 2010: the Commission proposed the same three-
part framework, including the same four PbD “protections,” or “substantive 
principles,” plus the “comprehensive data management procedures” requirement 
designed to “implement the substantive principles.”247 
Although the term “privacy by design” doesn’t appear in FTC complaints and 
consent decrees, it is easy to see the FTC’s PbD vision in action in a number of 
enforcement actions. In its 2012 Report, the Commission cited cases against 
Facebook and Google as specific examples of how the PbD framework might work 
in practice.248 In its case against Google, the Commission’s complaint focused on the 
fact that Google’s “Google Buzz” service—a social networking tool launched in 
2010—was turned on by default for users of the company’s G-Mail email service, 
and users who elected to turn off Google Buzz were nevertheless enrolled in certain 
of the service’s features.249 In its case against Facebook, the Commission alleged that 
Facebook misrepresented the degree to which users’ information was kept private.250  
Both cases eventually settled, and the final consent orders required both 
companies to implement comprehensive privacy programs which, if they did not 
perfectly mirror the Commission’s PbD directives, were reflective of the 
Commission’s desire that companies be proactive and brought further definition to 
its PbD vision. Each consent order required: 
(1) the designation of personnel responsible for the privacy program; (2) a 
risk assessment that, at a minimum, addresses employee training and 
management and product design and development; (3) the implementation 
of controls designed to address the risks identified; (4) appropriate oversight 
of service providers; and (5) evaluation and adjustment of the privacy 
program in light of regular testing and monitoring.251 
 
 247.  Id. at vii. 
 248.  Id. at 31 (“The Commission’s recent settlements with Google and Facebook illustrate how the 
procedural protections discussed above might work in practice.”). 
 249.  See Complaint at 2–5, In re Google Inc., (F.T.C. October 2011) (No. C-4336), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/10/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf; FTC Charges 
Deceptive Privacy Practices in Googles Rollout of Its Buzz Social Network, FED. TRADE COMM’N, Mar. 30, 2011, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/03/ftc-charges-deceptive-privacy-practices-googles-
rollout-its-buzz (last visited Feb. 15, 2017). 
 250. See generally Complaint at 6, In re Facebook, Inc., (F.T.C. July 2012) (No. C4365), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookcmpt.pdf. 
 251.  See 2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 31; see also FTC Gives Final Approval to 
Settlement with Google Over Buzz Rollout, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2011/10/ftc-gives-final-approval-settlement-google-over-buzz-rollout; Decision and 
Order at 4–5, In re Google Inc., (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011) (No. C-4336) [hereinafter Google Consent Decree]; 
Agreement Containing Consent Order at 5–6, In re Facebook, Inc., (F.T.C. 2011) (No. C-4365) [hereinafter 
Facebook Consent Decree]; Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers By Failing To Keep Privacy 
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As the Commission explained in its 2012 Report, the FTC’s orders in each case 
focus on the companies’ duty to implement a comprehensive program designed to 
assess risk:  
 The FTC’s orders will require the companies to implement a 
comprehensive privacy program reasonably designed to address privacy risks 
related to the development and management of new and existing products 
and services and to protect the privacy and confidentiality of “covered 
information,” defined broadly to mean any information the companies 
collect from or about a consumer.252 
Notably, the FTC advised that the Google and Facebook settlements are guideposts 
for companies seeking to implement PbD: “Companies should view the 
comprehensive privacy programs mandated by these consent orders as a roadmap 
as they implement privacy by design in their own organizations.”253 
There are other enforcement actions where the Commission’s PbD vision is 
apparent, if not terribly precise or well-defined. Its 2011 complaint against 
consumer reporting agency ACRAnet, for example, charges the company with 
failures suggestive of the language in the PbD sections of the 2010 and 2012 Reports 
and the Facebook and Google settlements.254 The complaint charges ACRAnet with 
failure to “develop and disseminate comprehensive information security policies” 
and “assess the risks of allowing end users with unverified or inadequate security to 
access consumer reports through ACRAnet’s portal.”255 The complaint also cites 
ACRAnet for failing to conduct risk assessments.256 Likewise, the FTC’s complaints 
against SettlementOne Credit Corp., Fajilan and Associates, and Lookout Services 
Inc. allege failures to implement “policies” and “procedures” and “systems” for 
mitigating cybersecurity risk, and failures to “assess risks” and take steps to address 
these risks.257 
 
Promises FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 29, 2011), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/ 
11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep. 
 252.  See 2012 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 31. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  See generally Complaint, In re ACRAnet, Inc., (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (No. C-4331) 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110809acranetcmpt.pdf [hereinafter ARCAnet 
Complaint]. 
 255.  Id. at 2. 
 256.  Id. at 3. 
 257.  See Complaint at 2–3, SettlementOne Credit Corp., (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (No. C-4330), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110809acranetcmpt.pdf  (“Among other 
things, respondents failed to . . . assess the risks of allowing end users with unverified or inadequate security to 
access consumer reports through SettlementOne’s portal[,] implement reasonable steps to address these risks 
. . . implement reasonable steps to maintain an effective system of monitoring access to consumer reports by 
SettlementOne’s end users[.]”); Complaint at 2–3, In re Fajilan & Assocs., Inc., (F.T.C. Aug. 17, 2011) (No. C-
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C.  PbD in Wyndham and LabMD 
Indeed the Wyndham and LabMD cases are illustrative of the FTC’s determination 
to impose its PbD program on companies. The settlement order requires Wyndham 
to “implement, and thereafter maintain [for 20 years], a comprehensive 
information security program that is reasonably designed to protect the security, 
confidentiality, and integrity of Cardholder Data.”258 The order also requires that 
Wyndham (1) designate employee(s) to be responsible for the security program, (2) 
conduct a risk assessment focused in part on employee training and vulnerabilities 
in existing systems, (3) “design and implement[] . . . reasonable safeguards to 
control the risks identified through risk assessment,” as well as “regular[ly] test[] or 
monitor[] the effectiveness of the safeguards’ key controls, systems, and 
procedures,” (4) “develop[] and use reasonable steps to select and retain service 
providers capable of appropriately safeguarding Cardholder Data,” and (5)  
“evaluat[e] and adjust[] the Hotels’ and Resorts’ information security program…in 
light of the results of the testing and monitoring required by [number 3].”259 In 
short, these requirements mirror, point for point, those placed on Facebook and 
Google in 2011.260 
The parallels between the Commission’s pronouncements on PbD and its 
allegations against LabMD are even more explicit. In its complaint, the Commission 
alleged that LabMD failed to, for example, implement and maintain a 
“comprehensive security program,” identify “commonly known and foreseeable 
risks,” and “adequately train employees to safeguard personal information,” all of 
which the Commission explicitly mentioned in its 2010 and 2012 reports.261 
Interestingly, the Commission had already identified P2P file-sharing networks as a 
particular area area of concern in 2010, three years before filing a complaint against 
LabMD. In its 2010 report, the Commission wrote: 
 
4332), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/08/110819statewidecmpt.pdf (“Among 
other things, respondents failed to . . . assess the risks of allowing end users with unverified or inadequate 
security to access consumer reports through Statewide’s portal[,] implement reasonable steps to address these 
risks[,] . . . implement reasonable steps to maintain an effective system of monitoring access to consumer 
reports by Statewide’s end users[,] . . . take appropriate action to correct existing vulnerabilities or 
threats[.]”).Complaint at 2–3, In re Lookout Servs., Inc., (F.T.C. June 15, 2011) (No. C-4326), https://www. 
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2011/06/110615lookoutcmpt.pdf (“[F]ailed to implement reasonable 
policies and procedures for the security of sensitive consumer information collected and maintained by 
Lookout[,] . . . did not adequately assess and address the vulnerability of Lookout’s web application to widely-
known security flaws[,] . . . failed to employ sufficient measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access to 
computer networks.”). 
 258.  Wyndham’s Stipulated Order, supra note 191, at 4.  
  259.     Id. at 5–6. 
 260.  See Google Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 4; Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 5–6. 
 261.  See supra Section III.A. 
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 The use of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) file-sharing software provides one 
illustration of how incorporating privacy considerations up-front may work. 
News reports have indicated that sensitive personal information has been 
shared via P2P file-sharing networks…. Some of these documents became 
available because businesses allowed employees to download P2P file-
sharing programs onto their work computers without proper controls or 
supervision. In response to this problem, the Commission sent letters to 
nearly 100 organizations whose customer or employee information was 
breached through P2P file-sharing software.262 
On the whole, the Commission’s case against Wyndham was founded on more 
egregious behavior—three separate breaches, known and unremedied—than in 
LabMD, where the company was, ostensibly, guilty of a single security failure: the 
existence of a P2P file-sharing application on an employee’s computer.263 Although 
the Commission’s case does not say so, perhaps, in bringing the case against 
LabMD, it had the foregoing from the 2010 Report in mind. 
D.  Practical Recommendations 
Anyone who has tried to pin down “Privacy by Design” knows the concept can be 
slippery. The notion has evolved substantially, and in many different directions, 
from Cavoukian’s seven principles first developed in the ‘90s. Even the FTC’s 
specific pronouncements in the 2010 and 2012 privacy reports give little guidance 
on what, exactly, the Commission expects when it requests that companies 
implement PbD. In this respect, the value of the FTC’s complaints and consent 
orders, in the Google and Facebook cases in particular, cannot be overstated. As 
discussed above, the Commission imposed several of the same key requirements on 
the two internet giants. 
Previously, the task of sifting through the FTC’s cybersecurity settlements was 
more daunting, but in 2015 the Commission published Start with Security: A Guide 
for Business, which lists ten practical lessons businesses can learn from the FTC’s 
50+ data security settlements.264 The following eight recommendations, intended to 
be more comprehensive, are put forth with those lessons (as well as the Facebook 
and Google settlements, and the complaints in Wyndham and LabMD) in mind. In 
the absence of comprehensive regulation from Congress, businesses that want to 
avoid the scrutiny of a newly emboldened FTC will, at a minimum, consider the 
following recommendations: 
 
 262.  2010 Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 66, at 49–50. 
 263.  See LabMD Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 264.  See generally Start with Security, supra note 95.  
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1.  Implement a “Comprehensive” Program 
Institute a definite set of policies and procedures designed to address every aspect of 
the company’s data security, and put them in writing.265 Designate an individual or 
team to be in charge of the data security program: the higher-ranked those 
individuals, the better.266 Indeed, data security should be a discrete and regular topic 
of discussion for the management team and board members (which discussions 
should be preserved in meeting minutes). It should also be a priority for all business 
functions.267 Instituting comprehensive data security programs can be time 
consuming and implementing appropriate security measures can be expensive, but 
do as much as you can reasonably afford. The FTC will expect more from larger, 
wealthier companies, companies with broad customer bases, and companies that 
handle especially sensitive data.268 
2.  Get the Basics Right 
Although cybersecurity can be complicated, it is not, on the whole, rocket science. 
Often, data breaches are the result of very basic employee mistakes, or simple, 
avoidable vulnerabilities exploited by hackers.269 Require robust login credentials for 
all employees, including multi-factor authentication measures and complex 
password requirements.270 Do not collect more data than you need to,271 do not keep 
 
 265.  See Google Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 4 (“Such program, the content and implementation of 
which must be documented in writing . . . .”); Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 5. 
 266.  See, e.g., Google Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 4 (Such program . . . shall contain privacy controls 
and procedures appropriate to respondent’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of respondent’s 
activities, and the sensitivity of the covered information . . . .”).  
 267.  See Start with Security, supra note 95, at 2 (“Experts agree on the key first step: Start with security. 
Factor it into the decision making in every department of your business – personnel, sales, accounting, 
information technology, etc.”).  
 268.  See, e.g., Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 5 (“Such program . . . shall contain controls and 
procedures appropriate to Respondent’s size and complexity, the nature and scope of Respondent’s activities, 
and the sensitivity of the covered information[.]”); see also Ryan T. Bergsieker et al., The Federal Trade 
Commission’s Enforcement of Data Security Standards, 44 THE COLO. LAW. 39, 41 (June 2015) (“More rigorous 
(and expensive) protections are required of larger organizations possessing large volumes of sensitive 
information.”). 
 269.  See Start with Security, supra note 95, at 1 (“[L]earning about alleged lapses that led to law enforcement 
can help your company improve its practices. And most of these alleged practices involve basic, fundamental 
security missteps.”).  
 270.  See id. at 4 (“If you have personal information stored on your network, strong authentication 
procedures – including sensible password ‘hygiene’ – can help ensure that only authorized individuals can 
access the data. . . . ‘Passwords’ like 121212 or qwerty aren’t much better than no passwords at all.”); Kevin 
LaCroix, Cybersecurity Enforcement: The FTC Is Out There, THE D&O DIARY (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.dandodiary.com/2015/04/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-cybersecurity-enforcement-the-ftc-is-
out-there.  On the password question, the FTC highlights the Twitter action specifically. In the Twitter case, for 
example, the company let employees use common dictionary words as administrative passwords, as well as 
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it longer than you need to,272 and do not give more people access to it than you need 
to.273 Encrypt sensitive data.274 Use firewalls to protect against outsiders and to 
segment sensitive data within internal systems.275 Install and update antivirus 
software on all devices.276 Implement robust policies for securing remote devices.277 
If someone has published industry-wide standards for your industry, follow them.278 
In light of the LabMD case especially, do not allow employees to install P2P 
software on their computers unless absolutely necessary.279 
 
passwords they were already using for other accounts. According to the FTC, those lax practices left Twitter’s 
system vulnerable to hackers who used password-guessing tools, or tried passwords stolen from other services 
in the hope that Twitter employees used the same password to access the company’s system. Twitter could have 
limited those risks by implementing a more secure password system – for example, by requiring employees to 
choose complex passwords and training them not to use the same or similar passwords for both business and 
personal accounts. Start with Security, supra note 95, at 4.  Additionally, user credentials should not be easily 
accessible on the network. See id. at 5 (citing In re Guidance Software, Inc., (F.T.C. Mar. 30, 2007) (No. 062-
3057)) (“Don’t make it easy for interlopers to access passwords. In Guidance Software, the FTC alleged that the 
company stored network user credentials in clear, readable text that helped a hacker access customer credit card 
information on the network. Similarly, in Reed Elsevier, the FTC charged that the business allowed customers to 
store user credentials in a vulnerable format in cookies on their computers.”).  Companies should also make 
sure users are locked out after multiple unsuccessful attempts to log in. Start with Security, supra note 95, at 5 
(“By not adequately restricting the number of tries, the companies placed their networks at risk. Implementing 
a policy to suspend or disable accounts after repeated login attempts would have helped to eliminate that risk.”). 
 271.  See Start with Security, supra note 95, at 2. 
 272.  See id. (citing In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., (F.TC. Sept. 23, 2005) (No. C-4148)) (“In the FTC’s BJ’s 
Wholesale Club case, the company collected customers’ credit and debit card information to process 
transactions in its retail stores. But according to the complaint, it continued to store that data for up to 30 days 
– long after the sale was complete. Not only did that violate bank rules, but by holding on to the information 
without a legitimate business need, the FTC said BJ’s Wholesale Club created an unreasonable risk.”).  
 273.  Id. at 3 (“Not everyone on your staff needs unrestricted access to your network and the information 
stored on it. Put controls in place to make sure employees have access only on a ‘need to know’ basis.”).  
 274.  Id. at 6 (“The method will depend on the types of information your business collects, how you collect 
it, and how you process it. Given the nature of your business, some possibilities may include Transport Layer 
Security/Secure Sockets Layer (TLS/SSL) encryption, data-at-rest encryption, or an iterative cryptographic 
hash.”); see also Bergsieker, supra note 268, at 41 (“Companies must encrypt sensitive data, absent a legitimate 
reason not to do so.”). 
 275.  See Start with Security, supra note 95, at 7 (“When designing your network, consider using tools like 
firewalls to segment your network, thereby limiting access between computers on your network and between 
your computers and the internet.”). 
 276.  Id. at 8. 
 277.  Id. 
 278.  Id. at 6 (“When considering what technical standards to follow, keep in mind that experts already may 
have developed effective standards that can apply to your business. Savvy companies don’t start from scratch 
when it isn’t necessary.”); see also Complaint at 11, United States v. ValueClick, Inc., (C.D. Cal., Mar. 13, 2008) 
(No. CV08-01711) (alleging that ValueClick “did not use the type of extensively-tested algorithms found in 
industry-standard systems, but instead utilized a simple alphabetic substitution system that was subject to 
significant vulnerabilities”).  
 279.  See supra notes 106 and accompanying text. 
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3.  Conduct Risk Assessments; Test Procedures 
The Commission emphasizes that some hacking techniques are well-known and 
common: these types of threats should be tested for.280 Testing should also be 
routine. Just because your security procedures are adequate today, does not mean 
they will be adequate tomorrow.281 Update software regularly.282 
4.  Train and Monitor Employees 
This is a frequent and vigorous talking point for the Commission.283 Employees 
should have easy access to the company’s cybersecurity procedures, and should 
undergo training, not only at the beginning of their employment, but also 
periodically after they have started working, to ensure they understand the latest IT 
and cybersecurity developments. Engineers and IT specialists in particular should 
be trained in secure coding.284 
5.  Ensure That Adequate Protections and Flow-Down Provisions Are Placed on Service 
Providers 
Businesses that have great security policies but fail to adequately verify and monitor 
the security practices of third party service providers (who often get access to 
sensitive information) are vulnerable to FTC scrutiny.285 Obviously, businesses 
 
 280.  Start with Security, supra note 95, at 10 (“There is no way to anticipate every threat, but some 
vulnerabilities are commonly known and reasonably foreseeable. In more than a dozen FTC cases, businesses 
failed to adequately assess their applications for well-known vulnerabilities.”).  
 281.  See Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 5–6 (“At a minimum, this privacy risk assessment 
should include consideration of risks in each area of relevant operation, including, but not limited to: (1) 
employee training and management, including training on the requirements of this order, and (2) product 
design, development, and research.”); see also Start with Security, supra note 95, at 12 (“Securing your software 
and networks isn’t a one-and-done deal. It’s an ongoing process that requires you to keep your guard up.”). 
 282.  See Start with Security, supra note 95, at 12 (“Outdated software undermines security. The solution is 
to update it regularly and implement third-party patches.”). 
 283.  See LabMD complaint, supra note 3, at 3 (alleging that LabMD “did not adequately train employees to 
safeguard personal information”); see also Start with Security, supra note 95, at 9 (“The company could have 
reduced the risk of vulnerabilities like that by adequately training its engineers in secure coding practices.”). 
 284.  Start with Security, supra note 95, at 9; see also Complaint at 2, In re HTC America Inc., (F.T.C. June 
25, 2013) (No.122-3049), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130702htccmpt.pdf 
(asserting that HTC “failed to implement adequate privacy and security guidance or training for its engineering 
staff”).  
 285.  Start with Security, supra note 95, at 11 (“When it comes to security, keep a watchful eye on your 
service providers – for example, companies you hire to process personal information collected from customers 
or to develop apps.”); see also Google Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 3–4 (requiring Google to acquire 
consent from consumers, separate from disclosures in its privacy policy and terms of use, before sharing 
information with third parties); Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 6 (requiring “the development and 
use of reasonable steps to select and retain service providers capable of appropriately protecting the privacy of 
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cannot control everything third parties do, but they should have third parties agree 
to security standards in writing, and verify that the third parties are keeping their 
promises.286 
6.  Fix Problems Quickly 
Although the Commission, when applying the unfairness prong of Section 5, is 
(theoretically) judging whether a company’s data security practices are likely to lead 
to consumer injury (a prospective rather than a retrospective analysis), indeed the 
FTC’s enforcement actions often come on the heels of a cyber breach, and how 
companies react to those breaches can affect the Commission’s and courts’ 
characterizations of the company’s security practices.287 Every company should have 
a detailed and robust data breach response plan: the plan should be spelled out in 
the company’s data security handbook, and employees should be trained in it as 
well. Although it can be expensive (for some, prohibitively so), a company that has 
had a data breach incident should consider retaining experts to help with the 
response.288 
7.  Publish Accurate Privacy Policies; Stick to Your Promises 
Likewise, the unfairness prong analysis does not take promises made in privacy 
policies and terms of use into account (as the deceptiveness prong analysis does), 
but, as discussed above, the failure to stick to promises in a privacy policy can not 
only result in an action based on the deceptiveness prong of Section 5, it can also 
color a court’s thinking on whether a company has been “fair.”289 On this score, the 
Third Circuit’s pronouncement, which for the time being is the highest word on the 
matter, bears repeating: “A company does not act equitably when it publishes a 
privacy policy to attract customers who are concerned about data privacy, fails to 
make good on that promise . . . exposes its unsuspecting customers to substantial 
financial injury, and retains the profits of their business.”290 You should, in 
disclosing your practices to consumers, spell out clearly and completely how you 
handle data (including purposes for which you use the data, how long you keep 
 
covered information they receive from Respondent and requiring service providers, by contract, to implement 
and maintain appropriate privacy protections for such covered information”). 
 286.  Start with Security, supra note 95, at 11 (“Security can’t be a ‘take our word for it’ thing. Including 
security expectations in contracts with service providers is an important first step, but it’s also important to 
build oversight into the process.”).  
 287.  See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 288.  See Bergsieker, supra note 268, at 41 (“Companies need to respond quickly and reasonably to 
identified vulnerabilities. For example, companies should consider retaining outside experts to address 
problems that exceed internal capabilities.”). 
 289.  See supra note 160. 
 290.  See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  
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data, and who has access to it), and do exactly what you say you will.291 Your privacy 
policy should be easily accessible and regularly updated to reflect any changes. 
8.  Show the FTC You’re Paying Attention 
Finally, it may help if a company can show it has made a good faith effort to 
examine the FTC’s complaints, consent decrees, and publications on data security, 
and put its recommendations into action. The Commission has a lot of power, but 
limited resources: close choices between whether to pursue an enforcement action 
against one company or another could turn on whether the Commission feels the 
company is listening. Cite FTC documents and consent decrees, and quote specific 
language in your cybersecurity program. As discussed above, the ten “lessons” from 
the FTC’s 2015 data security guide, as well as the Google and Facebook settlements, 
should be of special focus. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is likely that the final verdict on the FTC’s “unfairness” prong tactics has yet to be 
rendered. Should LabMD ever get a hearing before the appeals court, there are, as 
discussed above, plenty of facts which could distinguish LabMD from the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Wyndham. Not bound by Third Circuit precedent, the 
Eleventh Circuit could even potentially declare the FTC to have exceeded its 
authority in applying the unfairness doctrine to cybersecurity cases. 
In the meantime, the Commission is in the driver’s seat. In the absence of 
comprehensive cybersecurity legislation from Congress, the FTC has become the 
United States’ de facto cybersecurity regulator, and its unfairness authority gives the 
Commission a wide berth to set the boundaries of what constitutes reasonable 
cybersecurity. Companies desiring to steer clear of the FTC’s microscope will, at a 
minimum, implement the foregoing recommendations, paying special attention, 
also, to the Commission’s publications on cybersecurity, and its settlement decrees 
in cases against Facebook and Google. 
Unfortunately, in spite of what the FTC has spelled out, there are still many 
unknowns. In a rapidly changing and increasingly interconnected world, this is 
perhaps to be expected. As malleable and hard to pin down as the “Privacy by 
Design” concept can be, it is important for companies to at least grasp and adopt 
the spirit behind it:  better to think about privacy first than having to deal with a 
security breach, and quite possibly the FTC, later. 
 
 291.  See Google Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 3 (“[R]espondent . . . shall not misrepresent in any 
manner, expressly or by implication . . . the extent to which respondent maintains and protects the privacy and 
confidentiality of any covered information[.]”); see also Facebook Consent Decree, supra note 251, at 4. The 
Facebook and Google consent decrees also specifically prohibit certifying participation in a compliance 
program, such as the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework (since replaced by Privacy Shield).  See supra note 89. 
